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THREE ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF  
CHILD HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT  
by 
Jia Gao 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2015 
This dissertation is composed of three independent essays that focus on the economics of 
child health and development. 
The first chapter explores whether availability of the SBP has affected maternal labor 
supply by using variation in the SBP mandates within-state over time to identify the effect.  To 
increase the availability of the School Breakfast Program (SBP), between 1989 and 2012, 21 states 
passed laws that require schools to provide the SBP if the fraction of students eligible for free or 
reduced-price breakfast in their school districts exceeds a certain threshold. Using the CPS Food 
Security Supplement data between 1995 and 2012, I first show that the SBP mandates significantly 
increase program participation among mothers with a high school degree or below and among 
single mothers.  Then I estimate the effects of mandates on maternal labor supply using March 
CPS 1990 to 2013 surveys.  The findings suggest that among less-educated mothers and single 
mothers, a mandate that requires all schools to provide the SBP is associated with an increase in 
the probability of being employed and working full time, and an increase in weekly hours of work.  
However, weaker mandates do not have the same maternal labor supply effects. 
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The second chapter examines the effects of smoking bans on birth outcomes. Prenatal 
smoking has serious adverse consequences on infant health.  Among the newest policies developed 
to reduce smoking and second-hand smoke are smoking bans. Using individual-level birth 
certificate data from the Natality Detail File between 1995 and 2009, which is matched to county-
level data on smoking bans, we investigate the impacts of smoking bans in bars, restaurants and 
workplaces on infant birth weight, gestations, 5-minute APGAR scores and incidences of cleft 
lip/palate.  In general, bans are not associated with changes in birth weight or weeks of gestation.  
Surprisingly, we find small increases in rates of low birth weight and very low birth weight infants 
born to young women in counties that adopted at least one type of ban during the study period.  
We also show that the negative infant health effects associated with smoking bans appear among 
babies born to mothers who reported not smoking during pregnancy; this suggests that increased 
exposure to second-hand smoke is likely to be the mechanism. 
The third chapter examines the impact of a heretofore relatively unexplored input in the 
educational process—language environment at home—on student academic achievement during 
early childhood. Using the confidential data from Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-
Kindergarten Class (1998-99), we are able to exploit cross-sectional geographic variation in local 
language environment, augmented with the recently developed instrumental variable strategy in 
Lewbel (2012), to identify the causal effect. Our results show that speaking a language other than 
English at home has a sizable, negative impact on reading test scores in both third and fifth grades, 
but has no effect on math scores in either grade. We find no evidence that speaking a language 
other than English at home has any effect on the growth rate of test scores from the third to the 





Among OECD countries, United States ranks relatively low on many measures of child 
well-being. For example, the U.S. infant mortality rate ranks 27th among OECD countries and has 
nearly double the rate of countries like Japan. Child well-being, measured by health status, school 
performance, and cognitive and non-cognitive skills, is an important predictor of future health, 
education, and labor market outcomes. Therefore, an analysis of the determinants of child well-
being is not only important to the welfare of children but also to inform the development of a 
variety of public policies. This dissertation evaluates the effects of three specific determinants of 
child well-being.  
The first chapter is a study of the effects of a federally sponsored nutrition program—the 
School Breakfast Program (SBP)—on maternal labor supply. Established as a pilot program in 
1966, the SBP provides free or reduced-price breakfast to children from low-income families with 
the goal of improving their nutritional intake.  In addition to the health and nutrition effects of this 
programs on children, the SBP may affect the behaviors of other household members due to a 
redistribution of resources within the family. For instance, the program may create incentives for 
mothers to change their labor supply by creating notches in the budget constraint and reducing 
time spent on household production.  This study is the first to estimate the labor supply impacts of 
the SBP. The results show that among mothers with high school education or less and single 
mothers, the strongest form of mandate, which requires all school districts to provide breakfast, is 
associated with statistically significant increases in the probability of being employed and in 
number of hours of work.  Given that the labor supply effect of means-tested transfer programs is 
a central concern for policy makers this research sheds light on the design of a means-tested 
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transfer program that provides a valuable benefit to recipients and may help them to attain self-
sufficiency at the same time. 
The next chapter analyzes the impacts of clean indoor air laws on infant health. One of the 
leading causes of infant mortality and other negative birth outcomes in the U.S. is maternal tobacco 
use. As a more recently developed anti-smoking policy, smoking bans are designed to decrease 
smoking rate and reduce exposure to second-hand smoke. The literature has looked at the impact 
of smoking bans on smoking behaviors, but the effect of smoking bans on exposure to second-
hand smoke is not clear. Further, how smoking bans affect the public health through the channel 
of second-hand smoke is not well understood. Thus, the second chapter investigates the impact of 
smoking bans on several infant birth outcomes.  The results show that smoking bans are not 
associated with any increase in birth weight or weeks of gestation.  This suggests that, unlike 
cigarette taxes, smoking bans are not an effective policy instrument for addressing infant health 
problems caused by smoking, and may actually result in adverse effects. 
Another important factor in children’s early childhood development is the language that 
they speak. Language environment at home is one of the most important factors in explaining the 
test score gap between children of immigrants and those of natives. The third chapter estimates the 
effect of speaking a language other than English at home on academic achievement during early 
childhood. The results show that the use of a language other than English at home decreases student 
reading scores in both third and fifth grades, while there is no significant effect on math scores.  
There is no evidence that language environment at home is correlated with the growth rates in the 
test scores, regardless of subject. Since cognitive and non-cognitive skills developed in early 
childhood can pre-determine one’s future educational and market outcomes, our results raise 
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serious concerns about the long-term well-being of the children of immigrants whose primary 
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The School Breakfast Program (SBP) served more than 12 million children per day in both 
public and non-profit private schools at a cost of $3 billion to the federal government in the 2012-
2013 school year.1 Established as a federal pilot program in 1966, the SBP became a permanent 
program in 1975. The initial goal of this program was to provide subsidized breakfast to students 
from low-income families who might not be able to afford a nutritious meal. According to the 
eligibility rules of the SBP, children from families with incomes at or below 130 percent of the 
Federal Poverty Line (FPL) can eat school breakfast for free, and children with household incomes 
between 130 and 185 percent of the FPL are eligible for reduced-price breakfast.2 Students with 
family incomes above 185 percent of the FPL can still participate in the program but they must 
pay full price. Regardless of income, for many working parents whose opportunity cost of 
preparing a nutritious breakfast is high, the availability of this program, even at full price, makes 
it possible for students who live in busy families to eat breakfast at school. 
The research literature has documented the impact of the SBP on child nutrition and health, 
and even on school performance, but almost all of these studies examine the SBP effects only on 
the immediate recipients: the students who receive the SBP. The program may have also affected 
the behavior of other family members, but very few studies have looked at this question.3 Children 
are part of an economic unit within a family, and the SBP that targets children may create 
                                                           
1  The SBP statistics are available at: http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/SBPfactsheet.pdf, accessed 
September 2013. 
2 In 2014, 130 percent of the FPL is $31,005 for a household of four, and 185 percent of the FPL is $44,122 for the 
same household. 
3 Bhattacharya et al. (2006) estimate the SBP effect on nutrition outcomes of other household members. They find 
that the SBP improves two measures of dietary quality for other household members, but has no significant effects on 
nutrition outcomes. They argue that this lack of significance is due to small sample size. 
6 
 
incentives for other family members. For example, the food provided for children might lead to a 
redistribution of resources within a family; parents may feed participating children less at dinner 
and feed non-participating children more. Additionally, the SBP may affect parents’ labor supply 
by creating notches in the budget constraint and reducing the time spent on household production. 
As we know, the labor supply effect of means-tested transfer programs is a concern for policy 
makers. Therefore, this paper provides an analysis of the work incentive effects of the SBP on 
mothers.  
There are two mechanisms by which the School Breakfast Program could affect maternal 
labor supply. First, the SBP may create the same work disincentives as the other means-tested 
transfer programs because it provides free or reduced-price breakfast only to children from low-
income families. These families are inframarginal: they treat one dollar worth of food benefit the 
same as one dollar in cash income (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009). As a result, the subsidized 
breakfast offered by the SBP can be considered an income transfer, and this generates employment 
disincentives. Given that the income eligibility threshold is 130 percent of the FPL for free 
breakfast and 185 for reduced-price breakfast, mothers living in households with incomes close to 
130 (185) percent of the FPL may find it in their best interest to reduce labor supply so as to qualify 
for the subsidized breakfast as long as the value of the breakfast is greater than the foregone wages. 
The magnitude of these eligibility effects on labor supply depends on the monthly dollar 
value of the SBP. The more school-aged children a family has, the larger the work disincentives. 
For a female headed household with three children eating free school breakfasts, assuming the 
dollars’ worth of a breakfast is equal to the federal reimbursement rate for a free breakfast ($1.58 
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in 2013),4 the noncash monthly transfer is roughly equal to $95 (1.58*3*20). This amount is 
approximately equal to earnings from 13 hours of work at the federal minimum wage rate. 
However, the implicit market price of school meals is likely to be higher than the reimbursement 
rate because: (1) schools must operate the SBP on a non-profit basis, (2) 64 percent of schools 
serve breakfasts that cost more to prepare than the reimbursement rate (Bartlett et al. 2008), and 
(3) there exists increasing economies of scale; compared with individual households, schools can 
purchase foods at a lower price due to greater purchasing power stemming from the schools’ size 
(Ollinger et al. 2011). Considering all these factors, it is very likely that a representative household 
values a month of school breakfasts at more than $95.5 
Second, independent of the effect of the in-kind transfer, availability of the SBP itself may 
increase maternal employment by reducing the time spent on household production. Mothers often 
face tradeoffs between employment and household production (see, for example, Apps and Rees 
1996). By “outsourcing” children’s meals, mothers can reallocate time and energy to paid work, 
other types of household production, or even leisure. One descriptive study shows that the usual 
meal preparers whose children obtain meals at school spend 3.7 more hours per week in paid work, 
and 1.3 fewer hours in child care, than those whose children do not eat school meals (Hamrick et 
al. 2011). In this sense, the SBP creates the incentive for mothers to work longer hours, regardless 
of whether their children eat the breakfast provided by this program for free or at full price.6 
                                                           
4 In the 2013-2014 school year, the federal cash reimbursement rates for breakfasts are $1.58 for free breakfasts, $1.27 
for reduced-price breakfasts and $0.29 for full-price breakfasts. 
5 Compared with the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), which provided an average monthly benefit 
of $275 per household in 2013, the SBP is a relatively smaller transfer. Currently a family of four has a maximum 
guarantee of $649 per month in SNAP, and this benefit is phased out using a benefit reduction of 30 percent. 
6 On average, mothers aged 18-64 spent 39 hours on household work (including child care and shopping) per week 
during 2003-2008, almost double the time spent by fathers (Bianchi 2011). Since mothers are the primary meal 
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In this paper, I employ a quasi-experimental approach to study the effect of the SBP on 
maternal labor supply. To increase the availability of the SBP, many states mandate that school 
districts provide the SBP if the fraction of students eligible for free or reduced-price breakfast 
exceeds a specific threshold. In 1976, South Carolina passed legislation requiring school districts 
to provide the SBP if 40 percent or more of students were eligible for subsidized breakfast. This 
was the first state mandate. By 1988, another four states had implemented mandates to require 
certain school districts to offer the SBP. Between 1989 and 2012, 21 additional states enacted some 
type of SBP mandate, and the percentage of mothers living in a state with the SBP mandate 
increased from 14.74 to 65.29 percent. The variation in the timing of state mandate adoption is 
used to identify the impact of SBP availability on maternal labor supply. Using the CPS Food 
Security Data from 1995 to 2012, I first show that state mandates have a strong effect on school 
breakfast participation. Then this paper investigates the work incentive effects of the SBP 
mandates using March CPS data between 1989 and 2012. In the full sample of all mothers, I do 
not find any significant effects of mandates on maternal employment. But among mothers with a 
high school diploma or less and single mothers with any level of education, the results indicate 
that strong mandates that require all school districts to provide the SBP encourage labor supply. 
Specifically, strong mandates increase the probability of being employed by 2.6 percentage points, 
the probability of working full time by 3.4 percentage points, and the hours of work by 1.25 hours 
per week for less-educated mothers. The effect of strong mandates is even higher among single 
mothers. Weaker mandates that only ask certain school districts to participate in the SBP do not 
have the same labor supply effects.  
                                                           




This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, although previous research has 
analyzed labor supply effects of many means-tested transfer programs, this is the only study that 
estimates the impact of the SBP on maternal labor supply. The findings of this study underscore 
the importance of evaluating the indirect effects of nutrition programs when designing transfer 
programs. Second, since the SBP is a federal program, it is difficult to use a quasi-experimental 
approach to evaluate the effects of this program due to lack of state variation. This is one of the 
very few studies that uses the variation in state mandates about school participation to evaluate the 
effects of the SBP.7 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews past research on the labor supply effects 
of means-tested transfer programs and literature on household production and maternal 
employment. Section 3 outlines a conceptual framework for the effect of the SBP on labor supply. 
Section 4 provides information about state mandates. Section 5 and 6 lay out the empirical strategy 
and data used in this paper. Results and conclusions are discussed in Sections 7 and 8, respectively. 
 
 
2. Related Studies 
Although there is a vast literature on the labor supply effects of transfer programs, no 
existing studies have examined the work incentives generated by either the School Breakfast 
Program or the National School Lunch Program. Given that the SBP could affect maternal 
employment either by creating notches in the budget constraint or by reducing the amount of time 
needed for household production, it is useful to review two strands of the literatures: (1) studies of 
                                                           
7 To the best of my knowledge, only Frisvold (2012) uses the variation in the SBP mandates’ thresholds across states 
in the year of 2004 to estimate the effect of the SBP on student cognitive development. 
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other means-tested transfer programs and female employment, and (2) research on tradeoff 
between household production and labor supply. 
 
2.1 Means-tested Transfer Programs and Work Incentives 
Existing research provides evidence that many means-tested transfer programs discourage 
labor force participation and reduce weekly hours of work (for reviews, see Danziger et al. 1981; 
Moffitt 1992; Hoynes 1997; Currie 2003; Moffitt 2002). Most of these studies examine the work 
disincentives for female headed households, the largest recipient group in many transfer programs. 
Of all cash and noncash transfer programs, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, 
formerly called the Food Stamp Program, or FSP) is most similar to the SBP because both are 
federally funded food and nutrition programs and provide in-kind transfers to households. 
Therefore, I mainly focus on the research on the FSP/SNAP. Aside from SNAP/FSP, it is also 
important to review the literature on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF, or Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, AFDC before 1996) because a considerable fraction of SBP 
participants are TANF/AFDC recipients and the labor supply effect of AFDC is well studied. In 
theory, TANF/AFDC and SNAP/FSP both discourage labor supply for two reasons. First, the 
existence of a guaranteed benefit amount without any work/earnings creates work disincentives. 
Women may reduce hours worked or not take a job in order to become income-eligible for the 
benefit. Second, the benefit reduction rate (or implicit tax rate) reduces the incentives to work 
because the benefit decreases as the earnings increase. This benefit reduction rate is 30 percent in 
the SNAP/FSP, and now varies by state for TANF (ranging from 0 to 100 percent).8 
                                                           
8 The benefit reduction rate was 100 percent in AFDC from 1981 to 1996. 
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The literature on the labor supply effects of the Food Stamp Program (FSP) is relatively 
small, and there are no studies that look at SNAP. Fraker and Moffitt (1988) is the first study that 
examines the impact of FSP participation on labor supply for female headed households. The 
authors adopt a structural approach and use maximum likelihood to jointly estimate female labor 
supply and program participation. They find that FSP participation reduces work by one hour per 
week or 9 percent. Given that married couples may determine their labor supply simultaneously, 
Hagstrom (1996) uses a nested multinomial logit model to examine the intrafamily labor supply 
impact of the FSP. Both his structural model estimates and simulation results indicate weak labor 
supply effects for husbands and wives. He concludes that the labor supply of a married couple 
shows little response to changes in the guaranteed benefits and benefit reduction rate of the FSP. 
Since there is substantial overlap in participation between the FSP and other means-kind 
transfer programs, some studies estimate the work disincentives of multiple transfer programs 
simultaneously. For example, as an extension of Fraker and Moffitt (1988), Keane and Moffitt 
(1998) study the labor supply impact of several transfer programs, including the FSP. Their 
simulation results indicate that small to moderate reductions in the benefit reduction rate increase 
weekly hours of work for existing FSP recipients but lead to more recipients at the same time. 
Axelsen et al. (2007) investigate how welfare recipients make their employment decision based on 
transfer benefits and other factors. The authors conclude that transfer benefits affect not only the 
decision of whether or not to work, but also the decision of how many hours to work. Their results 
suggest that increased benefits in the FSP discourage work effort. Huffman and Jensen (2005) 
show that FSP participation and TANF participation are highly correlated, and participation in 
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these two programs jointly affects the work decision. 9  Notably, all of these studies employ 
structural models and use only cross-sectional variation in FSP benefits, which vary by family size.  
Researchers use structural models to assess labor supply effects of the FSP because there 
is little cross-state or over-time program variation in eligibility rules or benefits to exploit, but their 
results are sensitive to the specification of the utility functions and stochastic assumptions (for a 
review, see Moffitt 2002). To avoid these problems, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) use a quasi-
experimental approach to study how the historical availability of the FSP affected labor supply 
and earnings. Using variation in the timing of county-level introduction of the FSP during 1960s 
and 1970s, they find that for a female headed household, the introduction of the FSP reduced 
women’s employment by 183 hours per year on average, which translates to a reduction of 505 
hours among FSP participants. For the overall population, the authors do not find any significant 
effect of the FSP on labor supply and attribute the insignificance to a low FSP participation rate. 
Compared to the studies of the FSP, the literature on labor supply effects of TANF/AFDC 
is sizable. Historically, researchers found that AFDC had a greater negative effect on labor supply 
than did other transfer programs, and the effect was bigger for single women than married couples 
(Hoynes 1997). Early studies (for example, Hausman 1980; Moffitt 1983; Hoynes 1996) primarily 
adopt a structural approach by using cross-state variation, and show that the AFDC participation 
reduces female labor supply by 10 to 50 percent. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) also employ a 
structural approach to investigate the work incentive effect of AFDC and find that a one thousand 
dollar reduction in annual welfare benefits increases employment among single mothers by 3 
percentage points. Later studies, particularly studies after 1996, use reduced-form models and 
                                                           
9 Some sociological studies, such as Livermore and Powers (2006) and Elliott and Packham (1998), focusing on the 
role that transfer programs play in welfare-to-work decisions, will not be reviewed here due to the space limitation. 
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employ within-state over-time variation to evaluate AFDC waivers and TANF program (for 
example, Moffitt 1999; Schoeni Blank 2000). A majority of studies find that the existence of 
AFDC waivers and the implementation of TANF increase female employment due to the time 
limit on welfare participation and the termination of benefits under a work requirement.  
 
2.2 Maternal Labor Supply, Household Production and Child Care Costs 
As discussed earlier, the availability of the SBP, either at full price or reduced price, may 
affect a mother’s time allocation between household production and hours of paid work. To 
understand the link between maternal labor supply and household production, it is useful to review 
the literature on the theory of allocation of time and household production. Becker (1965) is the 
first to propose a theory of household production, where individuals maximize utility subject to 
time and budget constraints. Utility is a function of commodities that are produced using market 
goods and individuals’ time. Although Becker introduces consumer’s time, along with goods and 
services, into a consumer production function, his theory does not separate leisure from the 
consumer’s production time. To differentiate housework and leisure, Wales and Woodland (1977) 
formulate a work-leisure-household production model in which income, leisure and household 
production are determined simultaneously. This is the first model to treat household production as 
an endogenous variable, equal to the total time net of work and leisure. Gronau (1977) provides 
further justification for establishing the distinction between housework and leisure in the theory of 
allocation of time. This distinction, he argues, is a prerequisite for any study of time allocation and 
is extremely useful in the analysis of fertility, gains from marriage, demand for child care as well 
as labor force participation. More recently, Apps and Rees (1996) demonstrate the importance of 
incorporating household production in the labor supply model theoretically and empirically. 
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Cherchye et al (2012) provide empirical evidence that adults’ preferences are not only affected by 
leisure and the consumption of market goods, but are also dependent on the consumption of home 
produced goods. 
Although there is no empirical work that analyzes how preparing meals for children affects 
maternal employment, there exist numerous studies on another home produced item: child care. 
The cost of child care can affect a mother’s choice of occupation, place of employment, and hours 
of work (both the length and the start and end time). Researchers have examined child care 
availability, price and cost on the labor market behaviors of women with children, and most found 
low child care costs/prices/expenditures, and high child care subsidies increase maternal labor 
supply. The estimated child care price elasticities for maternal labor supply vary from substantially 
negative (-1.26) to close to zero (for reviews, see Anderson and Levine 2000; Blau and Tekin 2001; 
Blau 2003).10 
The empirical studies on child care costs and maternal labor supply can be classified into 
three categories. The first category investigates the imputed or predicted child care price effects 
on labor supply, using either a reduced-form model or a structural approach (Ribar 1995; Kimmel 
1995; Baum 2002; Connelly and Kimmel 2003). Studies within this category suggest a negative 
relationship between child care prices and maternal employment and show that employment 
elasticities are larger for single than for married mothers. The second group is reduced-form studies 
that estimate the impact of actual child care subsidies on maternal employment (Berger and Black 
1992; Averett et al. 1997; Tekin 2005; Tekin 2007; Blau and Tekin 2007). Although, theoretically, 
non-linear child care subsidies generate work disincentives for certain mothers, most empirical 
                                                           
10 Different model specifications and econometric methodologies are mainly attributed to this large variation in results, 
though differences in data resources and sample composition (by child age and marital status) also account for the 
variation (Blau 2003). 
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research indicates that subsidies increase maternal labor supply overall. In particular, they help 
single mothers to gain economic self-sufficiency through work. The last cluster of studies use a 
quasi-experimental approach to assess the effect of child care subsidies on labor supply. Using 
variation from exogenous changes in child care subsidies, these studies tend to generate larger 




3. Theoretical Framework 
Following Gronau (1977), I build a labor supply model for a single mother in order to study 
the impact of the SBP on maternal employment. To simplify the model, the situation in which a 
husband and wife make joint decisions in the labor market is not considered. Assume a mother has 
a quasi-concave and increasing, twice-differentiable utility: (, ), where C is total household 
food consumption, including breakfast, and L is pure leisure for herself.11 Suppose C and L are 
normal goods. The mother’s consumption is composed of two types of goods ( =  + 
): market 
good, X, with price unity; and home produced good, H, determined by the time spent on household 
production. Assume these two goods are perfect substitutes. The mother’s time (T) is spent on 
household production (  ), market work (  ), and leisure (L), and  =  +  +  . The 
household production function 
 = ℎ()  is strictly increasing, twice-differentiable, and 
concave.12 Formally, I build the following model: 
                                                           
11 This model can easily generalize to all other goods as long as the other goods are separable from U. Let Y denote 
non-food consumption. The new utility function (, (, )) will produce exactly the same Equations (3) and (4) at 
the equilibrium.   





 = ( + ℎ(), )     (1) 
. . ( −  − ) ∗  +  = (1 − ) ∗     (2) 
where a is fixed non-labor income; W is wage rate; s is the implicit subsidy of the SBP, which is 
defined as the difference between the reimbursement rate of the SBP and the market value of the 
SBP.  
If the mother works in the market, there is a solution for an interior optimum by maximizing 
the Lagrangian function with respect to X,  and L. The following equations result from the first 





= $%&'      (3) 
 
$
%&' = ℎ′()      (4) 
Equation (3) suggests that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is 
equal to the shadow price of time, /(1 − ), or the real wage rate. By assuming home goods and 
market goods are perfect substitutes, I obtain Equation (4), which indicates that the marginal 
product of household production is equal to the shadow price of time. In other words, one unit of 
time can buy one unit of goods. If the mother does not work in the market, then: 





= ∗ > $%&'     (5) 
where ∗  is the reservation wage, and $%&'  is the real wage. In this case, the mother is self-
employed at home because her marginal productivity at home is greater than the wage rate she 
would be paid in the market.13 
                                                           
13 Another scenario is that the mother only works in the market but not at home. If the marginal productivity of 
household production is always less than the real wage rate, there is no household production. Then I turn to the 
familiar dichotomy of work and leisure. 
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This model is graphically depicted in Figure 1. A mother, whose preferences are denoted 
by indifference curve U, chooses between consumption and leisure and is bound to the constraint 
line EDFT. The portion ED is a straight line with slope 
$
%&'; the portion DF is a concave curve, 
which describes the household production function; and the portion FT denotes the non-labor 
income a. This constraint describes the following scenario: a mother buys the first item using non-
labor income, produces additional goods at home until the marginal productivity of household 
production is equal to real wage rate, and buys the remaining goods from the market using her 
wage. If a mother participates in the labor force, she faces a tradeoff between working in the market 
and producing at home. The more time a mother spends on household production, measured by 
the horizontal distance from point T, the greater her consumption of home produced goods, 
measured by the vertical distance from the origin O. At the point B she maximizes her utility, 
where she enjoys L units of leisure and C units of total consumption. The point D is defined by 
Equation (4), where the opportunity cost of producing one more unit of home made goods is equal 
to real wage rate. For a mother who does not work in the market, her utility is also maximized 
when the indifference curve is tangent to the constraint. However, her point of tangency would be 
on the concave portion of the curve. At the optimal point, this mother only chooses between home 
goods and leisure.14 
There are two mechanisms by which the SBP could affect maternal employment: the effect 
of the in-kind transfer and the effect generated by reducing household production. For simplicity, 
these mechanisms are modeled separately. I first focus on the effect of the in-kind transfers 
provided by the SBP by letting  = 0. Since this program provides free (reduced-price) breakfast 
                                                           
14 If a mother only works in the market but not at home (which indicates that the marginal productivity at the point F 
falls short of the real wage rate), the constraint will appear as a straight line with a slope equal to that of wage rate; as 
in the traditional Robbins diagram. 
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to children from families with income less than 130 (185) percent of the Federal Poverty Line, 
such in-kind transfers create two kinks in the budget constraint. For simplicity, I only draw one 
kink (185 percent of the FPL) in the graph. Assuming the amount of transfer is ., represented by 
the vertical segment in Figure 1, the new constraint is the curve /01′2′3. Only part of the 
budget constraint shifts outward in a parallel way because the transfer disappears when income is 
above 185 percent of the FPL. Under this new budget constraint, the optimal point could be a 
corner solution at 1′, which shows the scenario where a mother decreases her labor supply so that 
her children remain eligible for the reduced-price breakfast.  
The shift of the budget constraint from in-kind transfer affects neither the marginal product 
of household production (the shape of the curve DF does not change), nor the real wage rate. As a 
result, Equation (4) still holds and is represented by 2′, indicating that the mother still spends  
on household production. Since both home goods and market goods are normal goods (including 
the SBP) by our assumption, the mother can attain higher utility by spending more time on leisure 
and less time on market work. Another scenario is that the mother whose children were originally 
eligible for the reduced-price breakfast may also decrease her labor supply because of the in-kind 
transfer. In this case, the new optimal point could be a tangent solution on line 1′2′. In both 
scenarios, the effect of the in-kind transfer will unambiguously discourage maternal employment. 
Next, I look at the second mechanism for how the availability of the SBP might affect 
maternal employment by assuming that all students pay the breakfast at full price and that the SBP 
could only affect mothers’ time allocation. The availability of school breakfast (a market good) 
makes it much easier to substitute market goods for home goods. Namely, it is cheaper to buy the 
goods in the market rather than produce them at home. In the model, s denotes the implicit subsidy 
provided by the school breakfast, and 0 <  < 1. According to Equation (4), the optimal time 
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spent on household production ∗  decreases when s increases from zero (here, the household 
production function has decreasing marginal product, that is, ℎ**() < 0).  As shown in Figure 2, 
there is a new budget constraint 51′2′6 with a larger real wage rate $%&'. The time for household 
production unambiguously declines. The consumption of home goods decreases, while the total 
consumption increases because both goods are normal goods.  
The change in leisure in the second mechanism is ambiguous, and so is the change in 
market work. Three factors could affect leisure: (1) the reduction of household production could 
increase leisure; (2) the income effect incurred by the rise in real wage rate increases leisure; and 
(3) the substitution effect from the rise in real wage rate decreases leisure. If the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and leisure is large or the income elasticity of leisure is small, 
then leisure will decrease, and time spent on market work will increase. Even if the mother spends 
more time on leisure, her time spent on market work could still increase as long as the decline of 
time for household production is large. In other words, if the mother finances the additional 
consumption mainly through the wages, the time on market work will increase, but if the implicit 
subsidy provided by the SBP is enough for financing the additional consumption, then the mother 
may work less in the market. Thus, the effect of availability of the SBP on maternal employment 
is theoretically undetermined. 
Based on this theoretical analysis, the direction of the maternal labor supply effect is 
ambiguous. The program generates both incentives and disincentives for mothers to work. 
Empirically, I test the net effect of this program to determine which mechanism dominates. 
 
 
4. State SBP Mandates 
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Although the SBP is a federal entitlement program, students are only able to participate if 
the schools they attend offer the program. During the 1990-1991 school year, only four million 
children participated in the SBP, and only 48 percent of the schools offering the National School 
Lunch Program also provided the SBP. To increase availability of the SBP, Congress amended the 
Child Nutrition Act in 1989 by allocating start-up funds to state educational agencies for 
distribution to schools to offer and expand the SBP. These grants, which are different from the 
federal reimbursement for each meal, were used to cover the fixed costs associated with offering 
the breakfast. In practice, most of the grants were given to schools with a high percentage of low-
income students and that promised to participate in the program for at least three years. This federal 
assistance was funded at a level of $5 million in fiscal year 1989, decreased to $3 million in fiscal 
year 1990, and ended in fiscal year 1996 (Fox et al. 2004). 
Additionally, in order to encourage schools to accept start-up funds from the federal 
government, states began to require that some or all schools implement the SBP during the 1990s. 
The structure of most state laws is that schools must provide the SBP if the fraction of students 
eligible for free or reduced-price meals (i.e., whose family income is less than or equal to 185 
percent of the FPL) exceeds a certain threshold. This state mandate is usually implemented at a 
school district level. The lower the threshold, the greater the number of schools that must 
participate in the program and the more likely a given student will gain access to the program. For 
example, New Jersey has a threshold of 0.2, which means that school districts with 20 percent or 
more students eligible for free or reduced-price meals have to provide the SBP. The threshold of 
zero means that all school districts must offer the SBP. Due to these state mandates, the size of the 
SBP more than doubled, from 3.8 million breakfasts per day in fiscal year 1989 to 8.1 million 
breakfasts per day in fiscal year 2002 (Fox et al. 2004). In the 1999-2000 school year, 75 percent 
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of schools that provided the National School Lunch Program also served breakfast, and in the 
2011-2012 school year this percentage went up to 90 percent (FRAC 2013). 
Information about state mandates over the 1976 to 2013 period is collected from state 
statutes and documented in Appendix Table 1 in detail. Although the first state mandate dates back 
to 1976, when South Carolina required that school districts with 40 percent or more of students 
eligible for free or reduced-price meals must offer the SBP, most states began to enact mandates 
after the amendment of the Child Nutrition Act of 1989. Before 1990, state mandates were 
comparatively rare; only five states legislated mandates. But from 1990 to 1996, 14 more states 
implemented the mandates to require certain school districts to offer the SBP. Since 1996, another 
eight states have passed mandate laws. Currently, 27 states have mandate laws, and 28 states 
provide some type of funding for school breakfast. While the threshold of the mandate varies by 
state, most states have not changed their thresholds over time. Seven states, however, did lower 
their thresholds gradually over the first two or three years of legislation, so as to give schools more 
time to prepare for the implementation of the SBP. Among the states that have the mandate laws, 
eight states require all public schools to provide the SBP, and other states have thresholds below 
0.4 with only two exceptions: Connecticut (0.8) and New Mexico (0.85). 
 
 
5. Empirical Model 
In many studies on the health and nutrition impacts of the SBP, researchers evaluate the 
effects of the program either by comparing participants with non-participants in the same school, 
or comparing students in schools that offer breakfast with students in schools that do not provide 
breakfast. However, this method may lead to selection bias because children are not randomly 
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assigned into treatment. Some unobserved characteristics, such as mothers’ preference about how 
much time is devoted to household production, may influence the SBP participation decision and 
the maternal employment decision simultaneously. Similarly, a school’s decision to offer the SBP 
is not random. School-level (or district-level) unobservables like local residents’ attitudes toward 
child nutrition and health could be associated with both maternal employment rate and the SBP 
participation rate. Additionally, there would be a reverse causality problem if a full-time employed 
mother were more likely to send her children to a school that offered the SBP.  
Without an appropriate instrument for program participation, this endogeneity issue cannot 
be addressed. More recently, a reduced-form model has become the most common way to estimate 
the effects of programs, with a reliance on using variation in policy changes. A central challenge 
for applying this method to evaluate the SBP is that this program exhibits no variation across states 
or within each state over time in income eligibility rules or level of reimbursement for meals. 
However, as discussed in the previous section, each state implemented the SBP mandates at 
different times. Thus, I use the changes in the SBP mandates within each state over time as a source 
of variation to identify the effect of the SBP on maternal labor supply in this study.  
Figure 3 illustrates the substantial growth in the percentage of mothers living in a state with 
the SBP mandate over the study period 1989 to 2012. As shown, the percentage of mothers living 
in a state with a certain type of mandate was only about 14 percent in 1989, but it went up rapidly 
to 50 percent in 1996, and finally reached 65 percent in 2012. Additionally, there was a moderate 
increase in the percentage of mothers living in a state with a full coverage mandate during this 
period. Here, the full coverage mandates are defined as the type of mandates that require all school 
districts to participate in the SBP. The ratio rose from less than one percent in 1989 to 14 percent 




5.1 The Effects of Mandates on SBP Participation 
Using within-state variation in the SBP mandate policies, I first examine the direct impact 
of mandates on SBP participation between 1995 and 2012.15 During this period, eight states began 
to implement certain types of mandates. Among them, Vermont, Washington D.C. and Rhode 
Island implemented full coverage mandates that require all school districts to provide the SBP.16 I 
employ the following linear probability model to test the effect of the mandate policies on program 
participation: 
78' =  9% +  :%0;<=' + 8'>% + ?'@% + A' +  B + C' + D8'  (6) 
where P is a binary variable indicating SBP participation; it equals to one if mother i living in state 
s in year t has at least one child receiving free/reduced-price breakfast and zero otherwise. 
0;<=' is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a mandate in state s in year t and zero 
otherwise; X are maternal demographic characteristics; Z stands for a vector of state-level controls; 
A' and B are state and year fixed effects; C' is a series of state-specific linear time trends, and D8' 
is the error term.   
The maternal demographic controls include age, race/ethnicity, citizenship, educational 
attainment, marital status, family size, an indicator of residence in a metropolitan area, number of 
children, and an indicator of having children younger than five. The state-level controls are annual 
unemployment rate, per capita personal income, poverty rate and population. Several other 
state/time varying policies might also affect maternal employment. Therefore, I control for the 
                                                           
15 The SBP participation data was first available in the CPS Food Security Supplement in 1995. 




maximum monthly AFDC/ TANF benefits for a three-person family, an indicator for an AFDC 
waiver, the maximum annual state EITC for a family with two children, and a measure of the 
generosity of Medicaid or State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), which is a 
simulated eligible measure constructed similarly to the one in Currie and Gruber (1996). Using a 
1990 national sample, I calculate for each state and each year the percent of infants and children 
who would be eligible for Medicaid or State Child Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP). This 
variable varies only by legislative generosity within each state and over time, which does not 
capture the demographic characteristics of an actual state population that might affect infant health 
outcomes. 
In addition to these control variables, state and year fixed effects are included because 
unobservable national time trends or cross-sectional state characteristics could bias the results if 
these factors are correlated with both SBP participation and the mandate policies. For example, 
national trends in people’s attitudes toward child nutrition and each state’s generosity in 
subsidizing the child care could affect SBP participation rate and also influence the passage of 
mandate policies. The time trends of some factors, such as food prices, may even differ across 
states. As a result, state-specific linear time trends are also included to account for differences in 
time trends across states. All estimates are weighted using the CPS supplement weights, and robust 
standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
 
5.2 The Effects of the School Breakfast Program on Maternal Labor Supply 
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Next, making use of the same source of policy variation and data from 1989 to 2012, this 
paper estimates the effect of the SBP mandates on maternal labor supply.17 During this period, 21 
states initiated SBP mandates and seven states changed the thresholds in their mandates. Six states 
(Florida, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, D.C., and Vermont) adopted full coverage 
mandates (the mandate threshold of zero) that require all school districts to provide the SBP. A 
number of mandate implementations and changes during the study period ensure that there is 
enough power to detect any impact of the SBP mandates on maternal labor supply. I estimate the 
following model: 
8' =  9E + :E0;<=' + 8'>E + ?'@E +  A' + B + C' + F8'  (7) 
where Y denotes the labor supply outcomes of mother i living in state s at time t, and 0;<=' 
refers to the mandate policy in state s at time t, which varies by state and year. The estimate of 
primary interest is :E.  The only difference between Equation (6) and Equation (7) is that the 
outcome is maternal labor supply rather than program participation; the control variables X, Z, A' 
and B are exactly the same. 
Three labor supply outcomes are examined: (1) the probability of being employed, (2) the 
probability of working full time, and (3) weekly hours of work. Outcomes (1) and (2) are estimated 
using linear probability models for ease of interpretation of estimated marginal effects. For the 
outcome of weekly hours of work, I use the Heckman (1993) two-step procedure, which generates 
a consistent estimator when there is non-random selection into maternal employment.18  
 
                                                           
17 Note that this is a reduced-form analysis. Complete data on employment (used in this analysis) and SBP participation 
(used in the previous section) are not available during the same CPS month. 
18 The selection equation estimates the probability of being employed on mothers’ age, race, citizenship, marital status, 





The data used in this paper come from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is a 
nationally representative household survey of the U.S. civilian, non-institutionalized population. 
It surveys approximately 60,000 households each month. The CPS data not only collects a wide 
range of measures relating to employment and earnings history, but also gathers extensive 
demographic information from respondents. 
Since CPS basic monthly data does not contain school breakfast participation information, 
I use data from the CPS Food Security Supplement to demonstrate the effect of mandates on 
program participation. The Food Security dataset has detailed records about food spending and 
public program participation for each household. The dependent variable is constructed from the 
survey question “Did any of your children receive free/reduced-price breakfast at school?” This is 
not a perfect measure of SBP participation since some program participants pay full price. 
However, given that more than 70 percent of SBP participants receive free/reduced-price breakfast, 
this measure should be a strong proxy for overall participation rate changes. The Food Security 
Supplement survey was first conducted in April 1995, and then once a year thereafter. This model 
is estimated using data from 1995 to 2012. After restricting mothers to those aged 19-50, the final 
sample contains 251,490 observations. 
The maternal labor supply outcomes are drawn from the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC) of the CPS (also called the March CPS). It contains individuals’ employment 
information for the preceding year, such as labor force participation, average hours of work per 
week, and hourly wage rate. In models of the impact of mandates on maternal labor supply, I use 
interviews from 1990 to 2013, indicating a study period of 1989 to 2012. The sample is limited to 
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mothers between 19 and 50 years old who are not in the armed forces. Mothers who were ill or 
disabled during the previous year or who report positive earnings but zero hours of work are also 
excluded (0.5 percent of the sample). Additionally, mothers whose children are all over 18 or under 
5 are dropped from the sample. I further clean the sample by excluding mothers whose household 
income is greater than $500,000 (in 2000 dollars) and those who work more than 65 hours per 
week on average (one percent of the sample in total). The resulting sample size is 433,144 for the 
March CPS. 
Data on the SBP mandates for each state are taken directly from state statues through the 
WestLaw database. The Annual SBP Scorecard Report published by the Food Research and Action 
Center since 2003 also provides some information about the SBP mandates. Data on AFDC/TANF 
benefits is obtained from Green Book (U.S. House of Representatives). The AFDC waiver 
indicator is coded using the Department of Health and Human Services information on the 
implementation dates for the waivers. The generosity of Medicaid/SCHIP is a simulated measure 
of public insurance eligibility. It is constructed in a similar way as Currie and Gruber (1996) using 
policy data from the National Governor’s Association. Data on annual state EITC is collected from 
Center on Budget and Policy priorities. Unemployment data are taken from Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Per capita personal income, poverty rate, and population data are downloaded from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. I merge the CPS data with mandate policies and state-level controls 
by state and year. 
Table 1 and 2 describe the summary statistics for variables used in this analysis. In addition 
to the full sample of all mothers, I also present the descriptive statistics for two sub-samples: less-
educated mothers (defined as having a high school diploma or less) and single mothers. In the CPS 
Food Security Supplement full sample, 10 percent of the mothers are black, 43 percent have a high 
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school diploma or less, and 18 percent are single. Mothers who report at least one child receiving 
free/reduced-price breakfast account for 11.2 percent of the full sample. In the sample of less-
educated mothers, 18.1 percent report that their children eat free/reduced-price breakfast. This 
number is even higher in the sample of single mothers: 22.2 percent. During the period between 
1995 and 2012, 50 percent of the mothers lived in a state with a certain type of mandate; 13 percent 
lived in a state with a mandate requiring all school districts to provide the SBP. The maternal 
demographic characteristics of the March CPS sample are very similar to those of the Food 
Security Supplement sample. In the March CPS sample of all mothers, 11 percent are black, 45 
percent have a high school diploma or less, 23 percent are single, 77 percent are employed, and 55 
percent work full time. The mean of average hours worked per week is 27.49 hours. Compared 
with the sample of all mothers, the sample of less-educated mothers has a lower employment rate 
(70 percent) and fewer hours of work per week (24.75 hours). The labor supply of single mothers 
is relatively high: 80 percent of single mothers are employed, and the average hours worked per 
week is 30.19 hours. In the March CPS full sample, there are 44 percent of mothers living in a 




7.1 The Impact of Mandates on SBP Participation  
Table 3 displays the participation estimates for Equation (6). Linear probability models are 
estimated for ease of interpretation.19 I start by measuring the impact of the SBP mandates in the 
sample of all mothers (Column 1), and then restrict data to specific subgroups (Columns 2-6). This 
                                                           
19 Probit models are also estimated for a specification check, and the results are quite robust. 
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is because SBP participation rate varies widely within each demographic group, and so some 
groups are more likely to be affected than others. Appendix Table 2 presents SBP participation 
rates by marital status, education level, race, income, and central city status. These tabulations 
show that while the participation is widespread across many demographic groups, it is highest 
among female headed households and low-income families. For example, among single mothers, 
22.18 percent have at least one child receiving free/reduced-price school breakfast (CPS data: 
1995-2012), and 34.30 percent participate in the School Breakfast Program (SIPP data: 2004). The 
participation rates are also uniformly higher among mothers with a high school diploma or less, 
black mothers, and mothers living in central city. In order to increase the power to detect any 
potential effects of the SBP, I limit the sample to a few subgroups that are more likely to be 
impacted by the program. 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the results for the full sample of all mothers. There is no 
significant effect of the SBP mandate on program participation. The results of maternal 
demographic control variables indicate that, all else equal, mothers who are black or single, or who 
have a high school diploma or less are more likely to have at least one child receiving subsidized 
school breakfast. This is consistent with the simple summary statistics of participation rates shown 
in Appendix Table 2. The likelihood of SBP participation also increases with the number of 
children. This might be explained by the stigma and fixed cost associated with SBP participation. 
Except for state population, the state-level controls do not have significant effects on SBP 
participation. All models include state and year fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. 
Column 2 reports the results for less-educated mothers. In this sample, the implementation 
of mandates increases the likelihood of having at least one child receiving free/reduced-price 
breakfast by 1.6 percentage points. Since the SBP participation rate is 18.07 percent among less-
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educated mothers during the study period, the SBP mandate increases the participation rate by 
approximately 8.85 percent (1.6/18.07). Among single mothers, the SBP mandate results in a 1.3 
percentage point increase in the probability of receiving free/reduced-price breakfast (shown in 
Column 3). This positive impact of the mandate is even larger in a more targeted subgroup: less-
educated single mothers. As displayed in Column 4, the implementation of the SBP mandate 
increases the probability of receiving a free/reduced-price breakfast by 1.8 percentage points. 
It is important to note that this positive association between the mandate and SBP 
participation does not exist among mothers with a bachelor’s degree or above, which is shown in 
the last column of Table 3. One possible explanation is that most highly educated mothers live in 
low-poverty districts where state mandates are not effective. Overall, as expected, the state 
mandate is effective in encouraging children in certain types of families to participate in the SBP.  
 
7.2 The Impact of Mandates on Maternal Labor Supply 
I have shown that the SBP mandate leads to a higher SBP participation rate. This gives me 
confidence that in the reduced-form labor supply models that follow, SBP mandates are providing 
enough variation in availability of the SBP. Table 4 presents the results of estimates of Equation 
(7) for the full sample and select sub-samples; only the coefficients of “Mandate” variable are 
reported. Here, mandates can be specified in two ways: (1) a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the mother lives in state s that had a mandate in year t and zero otherwise; and (2) two 
dummy variables, a “full coverage mandate” dummy equal to one if the mother lives in a state 
with a mandate that requires all school districts to participate in the SBP and zero otherwise, and 
a “partial coverage mandate” dummy equal to one if the mother lives in a state with a mandate that 
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only asks school districts with a high percentage of students eligible for subsidized breakfast to 
provide the SBP.20 
Each cell of Table 4 presents results for one labor supply outcome. Effects on the 
probability of being employed are displayed in the first cell of Table 4. In the full sample of all 
mothers, the evidence does not show that the SBP mandate significantly affects maternal 
employment (shown in Column 1). Among less-educated mothers, there are no significant effects 
when the mandate variable is specified as “Any Mandate.” When the mandate variable enters into 
the equation as two dummies, the results show that a full coverage mandate is associated with a 
2.6 percentage point increase in the probability of being employed, but a weaker partial coverage 
mandate does not have significant impact on maternal employment (shown in Column 2). Similar 
to the result for less-educated mothers, Columns 3 and 4 show that a full coverage mandate is 
associated with a 5.8 and a 5.7 percentage point increase in the probability of being employed for 
single mothers and less-educated single mothers, respectively. Table 5 displays the results for all 
other control variables in maternal employment models when the mandate variable is specified as 
full and partial coverage dummies. Appendix Table 3 presents the full regression results when the 
mandate variable is specified as “Any Mandate.” 
I further investigate the impact of mandates on the probability of working full time and 
display the results in the second panel of Table 4.21 Among all mothers, the evidence shows that 
the mandates do not significantly affect mothers’ probability of working full time. But among less-
educated mothers, single mothers with any level of education, and less-educated single mothers, a 
                                                           
20 The mandate variable is not specified as a full or partial coverage dummy in the participation equation estimated 
above because there was not enough variation in full coverage mandates between 1995 and 2012. 




significant positive association exists between a full coverage mandate and the likelihood of 
working full time. Results from Columns 2-4 indicate that a full coverage mandate increases the 
probability of working full time by 3.4 to 5.9 percentage points for different demographic groups. 
However, the partial coverage mandates do not have any significant effect in any sample of 
mothers. 
The state mandate may not only affect maternal labor supply at the extensive margin, but 
also at the intensive margin. Hence, the effects of mandates on mothers’ weekly hours of work are 
also examined and the results are reported in the third panel of Table 4. Again, the evidence shows 
that the mandates do not affect weekly hours of work in the sample of all mothers. However, in 
the sub-samples, the findings show that a full coverage mandate is associated with a significant 
increase in average hours of work per week. A full coverage mandate increases average hours of 
work per week by approximately 1.25 hours for less-educated mothers, 1.98 hours for single 
mothers, and 2.31 hours for less-educated single mothers. There is no evidence that partial 
coverage mandates are significantly associated with hours of work per week. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 4 suggest that a full coverage mandate increases the 
probability of being employed and working full time, and weekly hours of work among less-
educated mothers and single mothers. 
 
7.3 Specification Checks 
I perform several specification checks to test the robustness of my results. First, given that 
linear probability models can be biased and inconsistent if the estimated probabilities are not 
bounded on the unit level, I estimate probit models for all samples and find that the results are 
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robust to the choice of specification.22 Second, to verify that these estimates of the relationship 
between maternal labor supply and the SBP mandates are not spurious, I run several placebo 
regressions or falsification tests. Given that a large fraction of SBP participants are from low-
income or less-educated families, the labor supply effect of the SBP should mainly be focused on 
mothers from these families. There should not be any significant effect for mothers with higher 
income or education levels; or at least these effects should be small. If there exists a large and 
significant effect on mothers whose children are less likely to participate in the program, then the 
positive effect that I find earlier for the targeted group is unlikely to be a causal one. I estimate 
Equation (7) using three sub-samples of mothers who are unlikely to be affected by the SBP 
mandates. These sub-samples are: (1) mothers whose incomes are greater than $100,000 (in 2000 
dollars), (2) mothers with a bachelor’s degree or above, and (3) married mothers whose household 
incomes are greater than $50,000. As shown in Table 6, the coefficients of the mandate variables 
are statistically insignificant across all three sub-samples. There is no evidence that the SBP 
mandates affect labor supply among mothers whose children are much less likely to participate in 
the SBP. Therefore, the baseline estimate does not appear to be caused by a spurious correlation 
between mandates and state labor market trends. 
Third, I look at the effect of mandates on mothers’ labor force participation. Given that the 
group of mothers who are in the labor force may include those who want to work but cannot find 
a job, the labor supply effect of a full coverage mandate should also be positive and might be larger 
than the effect on employment. As shown in the first panel of Table 7, a full coverage mandate 
increases the labor force participation by 3.6 and 6.2 percentage points among less-educated 
                                                           
22 Due to space limitation, the results are not presented in this paper, but are available upon request. 
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mothers and single mothers, respectively. The magnitude of the effect is slightly larger than the 
effect on maternal employment. 
Fourth, the positive labor supply effects I find suggest that the main mechanism by which 
the SBP affects labor supply is that mothers redistribute time from household production to paid 
work. To confirm that this is actually the main mechanism for the labor supply increase, I look at 
the effects of mandates on other employment outcomes, taking advantage of the fact that the CPS 
asks respondents why they were not working in the past year. The responses include: (1) “not 
working because of taking care of home/family,” (2) “not working because of going to school,” 
(3) “not working because could not find work for a long time,” and (4) “not working because of 
other reasons not specified.” I create three dichotomous outcome variables: the first two are based 
on responses (1) and (2) respectively, and the third is a combination of responses (3) and (4). As 
shown in Table 7, among less-educated mothers and single mothers, a full coverage mandate is 
associated with a reduction in reporting “not working because of taking care of home/family,” but 
there is no significant effect on the other outcomes. The results indicate that availability of the SBP 
mainly gives mothers more time to participate in the labor force instead of spending time at home 




By using state/year-level variation in the passage of the SBP mandates, this paper estimates 
the impact of the SBP availability on maternal labor supply. I first show that the implementation 
of a mandate significantly increases the probability of children receiving free/reduced-price 
breakfast in families headed by mothers with a high school diploma or less, or single mothers with 
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any level of education. Then I estimate reduced-form labor supply equations with measures of 
mandate strength, using March CPS data from 1989 to 2012. In the full sample of all mothers, 
there is no evidence that mandates are associated with a significant change in maternal labor supply. 
However, in sub-samples of less-educated mothers and single mothers, the results indicate that a 
full coverage mandate that requires all school districts to provide the SBP has a positive effect on 
maternal labor supply. Among less-educated mothers, a full coverage mandate increases the 
probability of being employed by 2.6 percentage points, the probability of working full time by 
3.4 percentage points, and weekly hours of work by 1.25 hours (or 65 hours per year). Among 
single mothers with any level of education, a full coverage mandate is associated with a 5.8 
percentage point increase in the probability of being employed and a 1.98 hour increase in weekly 
hours of work. The fact that the significant labor supply effect only appears among single mothers 
but not married mothers is consistent with the literature on child care subsidies and maternal 
employment, which suggests that employment elasticities are larger for single than for married 
mothers. The results also show that a partial coverage mandate does not have a significant labor 
supply effect. 
There are several policy implications of these results. The direct goal of the SBP is to 
improve child nutrition and health, and policy makers may not take maternal employment into 
consideration as a possible spillover effect. However, this research illustrates that there is a 
potentially positive effect of the SBP on mothers’ employment. Labor supply of women, 
particularly single mothers, has been a focus of income-support policy reforms in the United States 
for many years. One goal of welfare reform in the 1990s was to help low-income women, 
especially welfare recipients, move out of poverty and increase their labor force attachment. My 
findings show the possibility that certain type of nutrition programs like the SBP can have positive 
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employment effects. More broadly, this study provides insights for policy makers on designing 
means-tested transfer programs which aim to providing benefits to recipients but at the same time 
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Figure 3. Percent of Mothers Living in a State with the SBP Mandate 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables (Variable Means) 
Data 1995-2012 CPS Food Security Supplement 1990-2013 March CPS 
Sample   All Less-Educated Single  All Less-Educated Single 
Mother Demographic      
Age  37.07 36.77 36.56 37.76 36.52 36.31 
  (7.36) (6.85) (7.15) (6.58) (6.74) (7.08) 
Race White 0.84 0.82 0.70 0.83 0.82 0.69 
  (0.37) (0.39) (0.46) (0.37) (0.38) (0.46) 
 Black 0.10 0.13 0.26 0.11 0.13 0.26 
  (0.30) (0.33) (0.44) (0.31) (0.33) (0.44) 
 Other 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 
  (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) 
Education <9 Years 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.05 
  (0.18) (0.31) (0.20) (0.21) (0.30) (0.21) 
 9-12 Years 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.16 
  (0.27) (0.39) (0.33) (0.31) (0.42) (0.37) 
 High School 0.32 0.71 0.34 0.29 0.61 0.32 
  (0.47) (0.45) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49) (0.47) 
 Some College 0.30  0.34 0.29  0.32 
  (0.46)  (0.47) (0.45)  (0.46) 
 College + 0.26  0.15 0.24  0.14 
  (0.44)  (0.35) (0.43)  (0.34) 
Hispanic  0.10 0.29 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.20 
  (0.31) (0.45) (0.40) (0.38) (0.44) (0.40) 
Resides in a Central City 0.20 0.25 0.31 0.22 0.25 0.32 
  (0.39) (0.43) (0.46) (0.41) (0.43) (0.47) 
Resides in MSA, Not in a 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.48 
    Central City (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
U.S. Citizen 0.90 0.82 0.92 0.87 0.64 0.80 
  (0.28) (0.39) (0.27) (0.32) (0.48) (0.40) 
Single  0.18 0.29  0.23 0.28  
  (0.38) (0.45)  (0.42) (0.45)  
Number of Children 1.93 2.32 2.03 2.25 2.32 2.05 
  (0.95) (1.10) (1.03) (1.03) (1.10) (1.05) 
Have a Child <5    0.26 0.27 0.21 
     (0.44) (0.44) (0.41) 
Total Family Income/1000 60.03 41.78 26.46 59.60 41.73 25.25 
  (53.99) (38.38) (26.88) (53.87) (36.39) (25.47) 
        
N 251,490 108,140 45,269 433,144 203,398 101,456 
Notes: Summary statistics for mothers aged 19-50. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. In March CPS sample, 
mothers who are in the armed forces or cannot work because of sick or disabled are deleted. Mothers who do not 
have at least one child between 5 and 18 are also excluded from the sample. 
Source: CPS Food Security Supplement during the period 1995-2012 and March CPS from 1990 to 2013 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome and Policy Variables and State Controls 
Data  1995-2012 CPS Food Security Supplement 1990-2013 March CPS 
Sample   All Less- Educated Single  All Less-Educated Single 
Outcome Variables       
Any Child Receives Free/ 0.11 0.18 0.22    
      Reduced-Price Breakfast  (0.31) (0.35) (0.34)    
Employed     0.77 0.70 0.80 
     (0.42) (0.46) (0.40) 
Work Full Time    0.55 0.50 0.65 
     (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) 
Average Hours/Week    27.49 24.75 30.19 
     (17.60) (18.29) (16.91) 
Mandate Policies       
Any Mandate 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.44 0.41 0.47 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) 
Full Coverage Mandate 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.14 
  (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) (0.32) (0.31) (0.34) 
Partial Coverage Mandate 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.3 0.34 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) 
State Level Controls      
Maximum AFDC/TANF for a  397.94 401.85 397.20 421.68 430.49 412.61 
      3-Person Family (150.11) (155.28) (152.31) (169.34) (179.99) (170.33) 
Maximum Annual State EITC 263.17 217.71 249.32 215.21 171.29 219.55 
    for a Family with 2 Children (489.07) (447.60) (475.56) (451.32) (405.04) (453.24) 
Medicaid/SCHIP Generosity 48.48 46.55 47.56 42.13 38.26 42.70 
  (13.45) (13.63) (13.47) (18.21) (19.57) (17.98) 
AFDC Waiver 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.79 0.71 0.80 
  (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.41) (0.45) (0.40) 
Unemployment Rate 5.77 5.51 5.60 5.88 5.90 6.02 
  (2.05) (1.83) (1.90) (1.97) (1.89) (1.99) 
Per Capita Personal  30.94 30.42 30.81 29.82 29.15 30.05 
        Income/1000 (4.77) (4.68) (5.01) (5.06) (5.06) (5.30) 
Poverty Rate  12.56 12.66 12.70 12.86 13.17 13.20 
  (3.21) (3.20) (3.25) (3.33) (3.37) (3.41) 
Population/1000,000 10.07 10.85 10.05 9.98 10.64 10.14 
  (10.15) (10.52) (9.82) (9.85) (10.14) (9.70) 
        
N  251,490 108,140 45,269 433,144 203,398 101,456 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Outcome variables are from CPS data. Mandate polices and state level controls 
are merged with CPS data by year and by state. Mandate policies are from state statues. AFDC/TANF is from Green Book (U.S. 
House of Representatives). EITC is from Center on Budget and Policy priorities. Medicaid/SCHIP is constructed the same way 
as Currie and Gruber (1996). AFDC waiver is coded using the Department of Health and Human Services information on the 
implementation dates for the waivers. Unemployment data is from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Per Capita personal income, 
poverty, and population data are from Bureau of Economic Analysis.    
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Table 3. Impacts of Mandates on SBP Participation, by Group 
 All Less-Educated Single Less-Educated 
&Single 
College+ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Any Mandate 0.0094 0.0159** 0.0129* 0.0178** -0.0094 
 (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0152) 
Age 0.0004 0.0003 0.0009** 0.0008 -0.0025 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0022) 
Age Square -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000* 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Black 0.0152*** 0.0131*** 0.0152*** 0.0126*** 0.0195*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0051) 
Other Race 0.0110*** 0.0083** 0.0127*** 0.0110*** 0.0041 
 (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0055) 
Education < 9 Years 0.0082*** 0.0081*** 0.0076*** 0.0070***  
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011)  
Education 9-12 Years 0.0059*** 0.0060*** 0.0051*** 0.0052***  
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010)  
Some College -0.0046***  -0.0058***   
 (0.0008)  (0.0010)   
College+ -0.0110***  -0.0118***   
 (0.0019)  (0.0025)   
Hispanic 0.0084*** 0.0070*** 0.0078*** 0.0050*** 0.0088 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0054) 
Resides in a Central City -0.0025 -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0001 0.0015 
 (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0057) 
Single 0.0034*** 0.0042***   0.0034 
 (0.0007) (0.0008)   (0.0041) 
U.S. Citizen -0.0049** -0.0058** -0.0066** -0.0082** -0.0051 
 (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0042) 
Number of Children 0.0052*** 0.0057*** 0.0077*** 0.0078*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0012) 
AFDC/TANF Benefits 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
EITC Benefits 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Medicare/SCHIP  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
     Generosity (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
AFDC Waiver -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0005 0.0053 
 (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0105) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0022 0.0007 
 (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0036) 
Per Capita Personal 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0040 
    Income/1,000 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0032) 
Poverty Rate -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0009 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0014) 
Population/1,000,000 -0.0015* -0.0018* -0.0003 0.0010 0.0019 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0042) 
Constant 0.0522** 0.0818** 0.0389 0.0708* 0.1273 
 (0.0252) (0.0314) (0.0322) (0.0412) (0.1132) 
N 251,490 108,140 45,269 31,735 65,387 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 2. All the models control for state and year fixed effects and state-
specific linear time trends. 3. Estimates are weighted using CPS weight, and standard errors are clustered at the 
state level. Source: CPS Food Security Supplement 1995-2012 
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Table 4. Impacts of Mandates on Maternal Labor Supply, by Group 
 
    
All Less-Educated Single Less-Educated 
& Single 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome: Employed     
Spec. 1 Any Mandate 0.0020 0.0041 0.0033 0.0010 
  (0.0071) (0.0132) (0.0092) (0.0119) 
      
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate 0.0192 0.0263*** 0.0579** 0.0573** 
  (0.0154) (0.0104) (0.0241) (0.0220) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate -0.0032 -0.0019 -0.0138 -0.0198 
  (0.0061) (0.0155) (0.0112) (0.0165) 
      
Outcome: Full Time     
Spec. 1 Any Mandate 0.0002 0.0059 0.0082 0.0119 
  (0.0077) (0.01312) (0.0100) (0.0132) 
      
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate 0.0201 0.0339*** 0.0527*** 0.0591*** 
  (0.0130) (0.0161) (0.0138) (0.0157) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate -0.0062 -0.0022 -0.0051 -0.0042 
  (0.0066) (0.0140) (0.0123) (0.0133) 
      
Outcome: Hours of Work         
Spec. 1 Any Mandate 0.0431 0.2267 0.0966 0.1541 
  (0.2789) (0.5103) (0.3288) (0.4438) 
      
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate 0.7522 1.2481*** 1.9752** 2.3138** 
  (0.5984) (0.4411) (0.8002) (0.6455) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate -0.1625 -0.0490 -0.4988 -0.5466 
  (0.2461) (0.5662) (0.4185) (0.5662) 
      
 N 433,144 203,398 101,456 54,658 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 2. Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome 
variable on a specification of the SBP mandate. 3. Demographic controls include mother’s age, age squared, race, 
ethnicity, central city status, education level, citizenship, marital status, number of children, and an indicator for 
having a child less than 5. 4. State level controls include a measure of the generosity of Medicaid and SCHIP, the 
maximum AFDC/TANF benefit, an indicator for an AFDC waiver, the state EITC benefit, unemployment rate, per 
capita personal income, population, and poverty rate. 5. All the models control for state and year fixed effects and 
state-specific linear time trends.  6. Estimates are weighted using CPS weight, and standard errors are clustered at 
the state level. 




Table 5. Impacts of Mandates on Maternal Employment (Full Results), by Group 
 All Less-Educated Single Less-Educated 
&Single 
Outcome: Employed (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Full Coverage Mandate 0.0192 0.0263*** 0.0579** 0.0573** 
 (0.0154) (0.0104) (0.0241) (0.0220) 
Partial Coverage Mandate -0.0032 -0.0019 -0.0138 -0.0198 
 (0.0061) (0.0155) (0.0112) (0.0165) 
Age 0.0209*** 0.0247*** 0.0214*** 0.0251*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0035) 
Age Square -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Black 0.0339*** 0.0124 -0.0219*** -0.0307*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0112) (0.0066) (0.0101) 
Education < 9 Years -0.1607*** -0.1539*** -0.1855*** -0.1879*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0129) (0.0171) (0.0171) 
Education 9-12 Years -0.1162*** -0.1272*** -0.1589*** -0.1540*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0060) 
Some College 0.0483***  0.0581***  
 (0.0030)  (0.0047)  
College +  0.0668***  0.1068***  
 (0.0046)  (0.0052)  
Hispanic 0.0101 0.0038 -0.0084 -0.0149 
 (0.0084) (0.0105) (0.0140) (0.0176) 
Resides in a Central City -0.0438*** -0.0278** -0.0146 -0.0199 
 (0.0107) (0.0138) (0.0110) (0.0140) 
Single 0.0561*** 0.0674***   
 (0.0067) (0.0095)   
U.S. Citizen 0.0982*** 0.0770*** -0.0359*** -0.0597*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0138) (0.0120) (0.0148) 
Number of Children -0.0423*** -0.0352*** -0.0269*** -0.0291*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0023) 
Any Child < 5 -0.1059*** -0.1105*** -0.0709*** -0.0827*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0056) (0.0079) 
AFDC/TANF Benefits -0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
EITC Benefits 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Medicare/SCHIP 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 
 Generosity (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
AFDC Waiver 0.0061 0.0035 -0.0030 -0.0079 
 (0.0043) (0.0076) (0.0143) (0.0170) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0018 0.0003 -0.0060** -0.0051 
 (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0039) 
Per Capita Personal  0.0011 0.0018 -0.0000 -0.0012 
  Income/1,000 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0025) 
Poverty Rate -0.0026*** -0.0067*** -0.0041*** -0.0063*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0017) 
Population 0.0014 0.0043*** 0.0051 0.0081** 
 (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0039) 
N 433,144 203,398 101,456 54,658 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 2. All the models control for state and year fixed effects and state-
specific linear time trends. 3. Due to space limitation, the coefficients of other race and constant are not reported.  
4. Estimates are weighted using CPS weight, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. 




Table 6. Impacts of Mandates on Maternal Labor Supply, Falsification Test 
 
    Income>100K College+ Married & 
Income>50K 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome: Employed    
Spec. 1 Any Mandate -0.0071 -0.0009 0.0103 
  (0.0097) (0.0163) (0.0100) 
     
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate -0.0051 0.0218 0.0039 
  (0.0168) (0.0311) (0.0168) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate -0.0074 -0.0082 0.0107 
  (0.0103) (0.014) (0.011) 
     
Outcome: Full Time    
Spec. 1 Any Mandate -0.0092 -0.0038 -0.0059 
  (0.0087) (0.0162) (0.0077) 
     
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate 0.0208 -0.0044 -0.0065 
  (0.0131) (0.0332) (0.0128) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate -0.0162 -0.0041 -0.0047 
  (0.0095) (0.0162) (0.0081) 
     
Outcome: Hours of Work       
Spec. 1 Any Mandate -0.3378 -0.1456 0.1381 
  (0.3800) (0.5782) (0.3427) 
     
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate 0.4321 0.0805 -0.1014 
  (0.6512) (1.4146) (0.6212) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate -0.5094 -0.2200 0.2017 
  (0.3632) (0.5788) (0.3804) 
     
  N 59,699 106,117 196,976 
 Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 2. Each parameter is from a separate regression of the 
outcome variable on a specification of the SBP mandate. 3. Demographic controls include mother’s age, age 
squared, race, ethnicity, central city status, education level, citizenship, marital status, number of children, and an 
indicator for having a child less than 5. 4. State level controls include a measure of the generosity of Medicaid and 
SCHIP, the maximum AFDC/TANF benefit, an indicator for an AFDC waiver, state EITC benefit, unemployment 
rate, per capita personal income, population, and poverty rate. 5. All the models control for state and year fixed 
effects and state-specific linear time trends.  6. Estimates are weighted using CPS weight, and standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. 
Source: March CPS 1990-2013 
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Table 7. Robustness/Sensitivity Test 
    All Less-Educated Single Less-Educated & Single 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome: Labor Force Participation 
Spec. 1 Any Mandate 0.0052 0.0073 0.0031 0.0007 
  (0.0056) (0.0122) (0.0078) (0.0123) 
      
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate 0.0213 0.0361*** 0.0623** 0.0672** 
  (0.0151) (0.0101) (0.0300) (0.0267) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0162 -0.0202 
  (0.0056) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0201) 
Outcome: Not Working Because of Taking Care of Home/Family  
Spec. 1 Any Mandate -0.0036 -0.0078 -0.0035 -0.0052 
  (0.0070) (0.0131) (0.0067) (0.0104) 
      
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate -0.0241 -0.0357*** -0.0613*** -0.07454*** 
  (0.0152) (0.0110) (0.0242) (0.0263) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate 0.0020 -0.0011 0.0140 0.0170 
  (0.0061) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0180) 
Outcome: Not Working Because of Going to School 
Spec. 1 Any Mandate -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0018 
  (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0038) 
      
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0028 0.0014 
  (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0051) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0021 -0.0022 
  (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.003) (0.0045) 
Outcome: Not Working Because of Reasons Other than Taking Care of Home/Family 
Spec. 1 Any Mandate 0.0008 0.0032 0.0010 0.0062 
  (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0055) (0.0083) 
      
Spec. 2 Full Coverage Mandate 0.0031 0.0104 0.0040 0.0141 
  (0.0020) (0.0056) (0.0041) (0.0082) 
 Partial Coverage Mandate 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 0.0022 
  (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0059) (0.0100) 
      
   N 433,144 203,398 101,456 54,658 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 2. Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome 
variable on a specification of the SBP mandate. 3. Demographic controls include mother’s age, age squared, race, 
ethnicity, central city status, education level, citizenship, marital status, number of children, and an indicator for 
having a child less than 5. 4. State level controls include a measure of the generosity of Medicaid and SCHIP, the 
maximum AFDC/TANF benefit, an indicator for an AFDC waiver, state EITC benefit, unemployment rate, per 
capita personal income, population, and poverty rate. 5. All the models control for state and year fixed effects and 
state-specific linear time trends.  6. Estimates are weighted using CPS weight, and standard errors are clustered at 
the state level. 




Appendix Table 1. The Mandated Thresholds for the School Breakfast Program, 1989-2012 
State 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Arkansas 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
California . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Connecticut 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . 
D.C. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . . 
Florida 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Illinois 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 . . . . 
Indiana 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 . 
Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Kansas 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Louisiana 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Maryland 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 . 
Massachusetts 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Michigan 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Minnesota 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Missouri 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . 
New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . 
New Jersey 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 . . . 
New Mexico 0.85 0.85 0.85 . . . . . . . . . 
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . 
North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ohio 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Oregon 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tennessee 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Texas 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . 
Virginia 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Washington 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Notes: The mandate threshold in the table means that schools must participate in the SBP if the fraction of students 
eligible for free or reduced price meal is equal to or greater than the threshold in the table. The number “0” indicates 
the SBP is mandatory in that state. The state without mandate is shown by “.” 
Source: the mandates are taken directly from state statues. 
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Cont. The Mandated Thresholds for the School Breakfast Program 
 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 
Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Arkansas 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.35 0.4 . . 
California . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Connecticut 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 . . . . 
Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . 
D.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Florida 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 . 
Georgia 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 . . . . . . 
Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Kansas 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 . . . . 
Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Louisiana 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 . . 
Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Massachusetts 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 . . . . 
Michigan 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.21 
Minnesota 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Missouri 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 . . . . 
Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . 
New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . 
New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . 
New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . 
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 . . . . . 
North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . 
North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ohio 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.332 
Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Oregon 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 . . . 
Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Rhode Island 0 0.2 0.4 . . . . . . . . . 
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.43 
South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tennessee 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.254 
Texas 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 . . . . . . 
Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Virginia 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 . . . . . 
Washington 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 . 
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 05 
Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Notes: 1. The mandate in MI began in 1980. 2. The mandate in OH began in 1977. 3. The mandate in SC began in 
1976. 4. The mandate in TN began in 1986. 5. The mandate in WV began in 1981. 
Source: the mandates are taken directly from state statues.
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Appendix Table 2. The SBP Participation Rates by Demographic Group 
Data   CPS 1995-2012 SIPP 2004 Panel 
   
Any Child Eat Free or 
Reduced-Price Breakfasts 
Any Child Eat 
School Breakfasts 
All Mothers  11.27% 21.50% 
Marital Status    
 Single Mothers 22.18% 34.30% 
 Married Mothers 7.19% 16.80% 
Mothers' Education   
 High School or Less 18.07% 31.40% 
 Some College or Above 6.41% 16.10% 
Mother's Race   
 Black 21.27% 40.90% 
 White 9.94% 18.10% 
Household Income   
 Income <= 185 FPL 28.66% 37.70% 
 Income > 185 FPL 3.48% 12.20% 
Central City Status    
 Central City 16.64% 30.53% 
 Non-Central City 9.78% 14.31% 
    
N  251,490 11,544 
Notes: This table summarizes the means of the School Breakfast Program participation using data from CPS Food 
Security Supplement during the period 1995-2012 and SIPP 2004 panel. We restrict the sample to mothers aged 19-
50 and with at least one child aged 6-18. 
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Over the course of the past fifty years, following the publication of the first report on the 
health effects of smoking by the U.S. Surgeon General (USDHEW 1964), a multitude of health 
problems have been linked to tobacco use.  One area in which smoking has been documented to 
have particularly serious adverse consequences is for infant health outcomes, including birth 
weight, length of gestation and birth defects (USDHHS 2004).  Adverse birth outcomes, 
particularly low birth weight, have been linked to longer-term negative impacts on both child 
development and adult health.  Treating infants with low birth weight also represents a substantial 
health care cost.  
In response to these and other health problems linked to smoking, local, state and federal 
governments have developed policies designed to discourage consumption of cigarettes.   
Historically, the most widespread, and arguably successful, of these policies has been the cigarette 
tax.  Although there is some disagreement in the literature as to the precise magnitude of the effect, 
pregnant women appear to be at least as sensitive to cigarette taxes as other demographic groups 
(Bradford 2003; Colman et al. 2003; Evans and Ringel 1999).  During the past twenty years, state 
and local level smoking bans, in venues ranging from workplaces to bars and restaurants, have 
also become increasingly common.   
Research on the effect of smoking bans on the general adult population has produced mixed 
results; while some studies have found significant reductions in smoking (e.g., Evans et al. 1999), 
other studies have found little to no effect (e,g., Bitler et al. 2010).  However, relatively less is 
known about the impact of smoking bans on pregnant women and infants.  Adams et al. (2012) 
show that private workplace bans increase third-trimester quit rates among pregnant women who 
smoked before becoming pregnant. Markowitz et al. (2013) find that state-level restrictions in 
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restaurants and workplaces have very limited positive effects on birth weight in data from the 
Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS), which covers a subset of the US 
population. Briggs and Green (2012) look at the infant health effect of bans enacted before 2004; 
however, adoption rates for bans were low before 2005.  
In this study, we use data from the U.S. Natality Detail File, which covers all of the births 
in the U.S. over the period 1995 to 2009 to test the impacts of smoking bans and cigarette taxes on 
birth weight and other measures of infant health. The availability of county-level geographic 
information in this dataset also allows for rich variation in policy, as we are able to measure the 
effects of ban adoption at both the state and local levels.  Between 1995 and 2009, 27 states adopted 
new smoking bans and the average coverage level by at least one type of ban at the county level 
increased from 2 to 47 percent.  Therefore, we are able to exploit a great deal of both cross-
sectional and time variation in policy compared to existing studies.  We also look at a rich set of 
measures of infant health, including very low birth weight, 5-minute APGAR scores and incidence 
of cleft lip/palate (a birth defect strongly linked to maternal smoking in the clinical literature).  
Our results show that, in general, smoking bans are not associated with any changes in 
mean grams of birth weight or weeks of gestation.  We also find that both restaurant/bar bans and 
workplaces bans are associated with small but meaningful increases of the probability of low birth 
weight and very low birth weight among infants born to women aged 14-24. The lack of health-
improving effects implies that bans probably do not significantly reduce maternal smoking during 
pregnancy.  We show that the negative infant health effects associated with smoking bans are 
found in babies born to mothers who reported not smoking at all during pregnancy – suggesting 






2.1 Evidence on Smoking and Infant Health 
The detrimental effect of smoking on reproductive health is well established in the research 
literature. Smoking increases the risk of pregnancy complications such as placental abruption, 
premature rupture, as well as birth defects, and is also likely to lead to miscarriage, stillbirth, low 
birth weight, premature birth, fetal death and infant mortality (HHS 2004). Of these potential 
negative infant health outcomes, low birth weight (LBW, under 2,500 grams) and very low birth 
weight (VLBW, under 1,500 grams) stand out for several reasons. First, LBW and VLBW can 
lead to a higher risk of infant mortality and morbidity (McCormick 1985; Matthews 2001; Vogler 
and Kozlowski 2002). Second, the direct medical cost of LBW and VLBW in infants is extremely 
high and increases over time as medical technology improves (Almond et al. 2005).  For babies 
who survive to age one, LBW and VLBW are also correlated with worse health outcomes later in 
life (McCormick et al. 1992; Corman and Chaikind 1998).  
Additional adverse health outcomes for infants that previous studies have associated with 
smoking include preterm delivery (gestation < 37 weeks) (HHS 2004), low APGAR scores1 
(Kallen 2001; Garn et al. 1981) and birth defects such as limb reduction, clubfoot, oral cleft (cleft 
lip/palate), defect of the gastrointestinal system and cardiovascular defects (HHS 2004; Hackshaw 
et al. 2011; Honein et al. 2001).  Of all of the birth defects mentioned above, smoking appears to 
have the largest effect on limb defects: the probability of delivering a baby with missing or 
                                                           
1 A 5-minute APGAR test score is recorded for all infants five minutes after birth; the score is designed to provide 
information to doctors about how well the baby is doing outside mother’s womb. The maximum possible score of 10 
is made up of 0, 1 or 2 points in the following categories: color, heart rate, reflexes, muscle tone, respiration.   
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deformed limbs or a cleft lip is 25 percent higher for pregnant women who smoke compared to 
non-smoking pregnant women (Hackshaw et al. 2011).   
 
2.2 Public Policy and Smoking 
  An early approach that significantly decreased maternal smoking during the 1990s in the 
United States was increasing cigarette tax rates (Evans and Ringel 1999; Ringel and Evans 2001; 
Bradford 2003).  Clean indoor air ordinances or smoke-free laws are a more recent policy 
development; although local statutes to limit smoking in public places date to the 1970s, most of 
the original laws were not particularly stringent. During the late 1990s there was renewed interest 
in enacting smoke-free laws and by 2011, 79.4 percent of the U.S. population lived in an area with 
some type of ban on smoking in workplaces, restaurants, and/or bars (RWJF 2011).  
Smoke-free laws/smoking bans are designed not only to improve the health of smokers, 
but also to protect the public from exposure to second-hand smoke. The majority of studies to date 
have found evidence that workplace restrictions or bans decrease cigarette smoking rates (Baile et 
al. 1991; Longo et al. 1996; Evans et al.1999; Adams et al. 2012). However, not all studies find a 
significant effect of bans on smoking behavior. Bitler et al. (2010) find no significant correlation 
between clean indoor air laws and reduction of smoking in workplaces, school areas, and 
restaurants, and they find that bar bans only decrease smoking for bartenders. The evidence of the 
impact of smoke-free policies on passive smoking (or second-hand smoke) is mixed, as well. Adda 
and Cornaglia (2010) find an unintended effect of smoking bans on children: bans in bars and 
restaurants increase second-hand smoke exposure by displacing smokers to private places, usually 
homes. However, Carpenter et al. (2010) do not find evidence of this kind of displacement effect 
when studying the public-place smoking restrictions in Canada.  
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If bans reduce smoking rates for pregnant women, it seems likely based upon the clinical 
literature that they should also improve infant health, especially by decreasing the incidence of 
LBW and of preterm delivery. However, the direction of any passive smoking effect is less clear.  
If, as Adda and Cornaglia (2010) suggest, a limitation on workplace smoking induces fathers to 
smoke more at home, pregnant mothers and infants may have worse health outcomes. Furthermore, 
smoking bans in restaurants and bars could lead more pregnant women to frequent these 
establishments, where they might consume alcohol or eat less healthy foods. These bans could also 
increase the number of pregnant women who choose to continue to work in bars and restaurants 
during pregnancy, which may also be detrimental to infant health.  
 
2.3 Evidence on Smoking Bans and Infant Health  
Recently, a handful of studies have emerged that look at the infant health effects of smoking 
bans put into effect outside of the United States (Kabir et al. 2009; Bharadwaj et al. 2014; Cox et 
al. 2013), but fewer studies consider the effect of smoking bans on infant health outcomes in the 
United States.   
Amaral (2009) performs a case study for California to evaluate the impact of smoke-free 
ordinances in workplaces on infant health during the period 1988-2004. Her results indicate that 
workplace bans decrease average birth weight.  Briggs and Green (2012) estimate the effect of 
workplace smoking bans of various stringencies on birth weight and gestation using data from 
Natality Detail File Data between 1989 and 2004.  They estimate the effect of state-level ban 
adoption, while controlling for any pre-existing local bans as a proxy for voter demand for health, 
and find significant negative effects of the most stringent smoke-free laws in several cases.  The 
study does not consider the effects of restaurant and/or bar bans.  It is also based upon a sample 
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period when adoption of bans was far less common than was in the late 2000s (as shown in Figure 
1).   
Markowitz (2008) finds that state-level bans in restaurants are associated with significantly 
lower rates of mortality from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) between 1973 and 2003, 
while smoking bans in workplaces has no significant effect on incidence of SIDS.  Markowitz et 
al. (2013) look at the impact of cigarette taxes and smoking bans on infant birth weight and 
gestation. They find that workplace bans are not associated with any improvement in infant birth 
weight or gestation, while restaurant bans increase weeks of gestation for infants born to mothers 
aged 25-34. This study differs from ours in several ways. First, their data set (PRAMS) is not 
nationally representative; it ranges from 11 states in 1996 to 28 states in 2008.  Additionally, the 
PRAMS is comprised of survey data attached to birth certificate records, and the response rate is 
only about 65% (70% in earlier years) overall, with lower rates for Black mothers, mothers having 
low birth weight infants, unmarried mothers and mothers with low education.2  Our analysis is on 
the universe of births as recorded on birth certificates in the United States between 1995 and 2009. 
Finally, we are able to exploit greater variation in policy by measuring bans at the county rather 




3.1 Infant Birth Data 
                                                           
2 The response rate and the availability of PRAMS data by year and by state is shown in CDC website: 
http://www.cdc.gov/prams/statesyearsdata.htm. Shulman et al. (2006) discuss the determine characteristics 
associated with the response rate of 2001 PRAMS. 
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The birth data come from the Natality Detail File, which contains information for all live 
births in United States. The data are taken directly from the birth certificate and provide 
information about infant birth date (year and month) and place (state and county)3, demographic 
characteristics of mother and baby, and birth-related health outcomes, such as birth weight, 
gestational age, APGAR scores and complications during the birth. We use data from 1995 through 
2009.   
In order to construct a data set for analysis, we start with data on the full universe of births 
nationwide during this period.  We drop approximately 26 percent of these observations in our 
baseline sample because they are for mothers who live in counties too small to be identified in the 
1995-2004 public release data (population<250,000). 4  We then drop multiple births 
(approximately 3 percent of remaining sample) because the threshold for low birth weight is 
different for singleton and multiple births. We also exclude births to mothers below the age of 14 
and above the age of 45 (approximately 3 percent of remaining sample) because of much higher 
risk of adverse outcomes at these ages.   After dropping the certificates with missing information 
on birth weight and gestation (approximately 6 percent of remaining sample), we have just over 
40 million observations.  
The demographic control variables in our models will be mother’s age, race, education, 
and marital status.5 Unfortunately, birth certificates do not contain household income, which is 
likely to be an important factor that affects infant health. However, we do control for maternal 
                                                           
3 Starting in 2005, geographic identifiers were only available in the restricted access version of the dataset, which we 
have used in this analysis.   
4 The missing of small counties (population < 250,000) before 2004 leads to an unbalanced panel for our study. We 
examine the robustness of results by dropping the small counties after 2004 in our specification checks. 
5 In the sample, approximately 1 percent of births have race missing values, and 0.5 percent of births have education 
missing values. In these cases, we construct dummy variables to indicate the missing education or race status. 
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education as a proxy for income. In addition, the birth order and the sex of the infant are also 
included in the model. Our main interest is the effect of smoking bans on infant health outcomes. 
For birth weight, we use both a continuous measure of birth weight in grams, as well as discrete 
variables to indicate whether the infants are LBW or VLBW.  For gestation, we have both a 
continuous measure of gestation period in weeks and a discrete measure of low gestation 
(gestation<37 weeks).  For 5-minute APGAR scores, we employ a single discrete variable to 
measure whether the infants have low APGAR scores (most commonly defined as below 76). We 
also use a discrete variable to indicate the presence of cleft lip or palate. 
Tables 1 and 2 describe the main variables from Natality Detail File and report their means 
and standard deviations for each maternal age group. The mean of birth weight is 3,238 grams for 
births to 14-24 year old mothers and 3,360 grams for births to mothers older than 25. Low birth 
weight is a relatively rare problem: LBW infants account for 6.3 percent of the full sample and 
VLBW infants account for just over 1 percent. The mean of gestation (between 38.72 and 38.57 
weeks) changes very little by maternal age, with about 9 percent of infants having low gestation. 
Approximately 78 percent of birth certificate files contain a report on whether the mother smoked 
during pregnancy.  By this measure, the prevalence of smoking appears to vary quite a bit by 
maternal age; mothers between 14 and 24 are about twice as likely to report smoking compared to 
mothers aged 35 to 45.   
 
3.2 Data on Smoking Bans 
                                                           
6 The most recent policy statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics and American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologist (2006) states that scores below 7 indicate the need for further medical attention and/or follow up. 
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Data on the local clean indoor air laws are from the American’s Nonsmokers’ Rights 
Foundation database. Our measures of smoking bans identify coverage of 100% smoke-free/clean 
indoor air laws for restaurants, bars and workplaces at the county level.  The 100% smoke-free 
bans prohibit smoking with no exceptions. Because some of the bans are county-level and some 
are sub-county level (i.e. townships, municipalities), the variable used in our analysis is the fraction 
of a county’s population in a given year that is covered by a given type of smoking ban7.  For 
example, a ban variable with the value of one indicates all of the population within the county is 
fully covered by the smoking ban. If a ban variable is less than one (i.e., 0.50), it means that only 
a certain percentage (50%) of residents in that county are covered by the bans.  
Over the period we study, the average fraction of county population covered by some type 
of smoking ban increased from 1.5 to 47 percent nationwide. Figure 1 shows the substantial growth 
in coverage by each type of bans. Among all three types of bans, bar bans were the least popular. 
In 1995, the coverage of bar bans was only approximately 0.1 percent at the county level across 
the country. Even in 2003, the coverage of bar bans was still limited to 3 percent. At the end of 
2009, the coverage ratio had grown to 30 percent. Workplace bans were more common than bar 
bans, but still comparatively rare, in 1995, with an average 0.6 percent county-level coverage 
across the country.  By 2009, the coverage ratio has almost risen to 40 percent.  Following a similar 
trend, the coverage rate of restaurant bans went up from 1 percent in 1995 to 6 percent in 2003, 




                                                           
7 We are extremely grateful for Eric Nesson for sharing the data and programs that construct this measure with us. 
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Smoking bans have the potential to affect infant birth outcomes through both maternal 
cigarette consumption and the intake of second-hand smoke. Recognizing that there is more than 
one way in which policy may affect outcomes, we estimate a reduced form model to identify the 
total policy effect on birth outcomes.  This total effect captures both direct effects arising from 
changes in maternal smoking behavior and indirect effects from changes in exposure to second-
hand smoke or other factors.  The model is: 
YH8'I = 8'I> + A%1;I + AE' + 7'IC + 9I + 9 + DH8'I   (1) 
where Y denotes the birth outcome j of infant i born in year t and whose mother is a resident in 
county c of state s, and X is a vector of infant and maternal demographic characteristics.  The  
outcomes are: (1) birth weight in grams, (2) probability of low birth weight, (3) probability of very 
low birth weight, (4) weeks of gestation, (5) probability of low gestation, (6) probability of a low 
5-minute APGAR score, and (7) probability of cleft lip/palate.  All models are estimated by OLS 
with robust standard errors that are clustered at the state level.8   
Bans vary by county and year; the coefficient of primary interest in the estimating equation 
is A%.  Unobservable national time trends or cross-sectional state characteristics could bias our 
results if these factors were correlated with both infant birth outcomes and smoking policies, so 
we include both county (9I) and year (9) fixed effects. Therefore, the coefficient A% is identified 
exclusively by changes in county smoking policies over time. We also add county specific linear 
time trends to account for differences in trends across counties with bans and counties without 
                                                           
8 For the discrete outcomes, as a specification check, probit models are also performed for a sub-sample of pregnant 




bans in our specification checks.9 The significant amount of ban adoption that takes place during 
our study period ensures that this coefficient should be well identified, and the results are robust. 
We control for state-level cigarette tax rates (T) using data from The Tax Burden on 
Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker 2011).  The cigarette tax variable is the tax on a pack of 20 
cigarettes, adjusted for inflation to 2000 dollars.   There are also several other state/county/year-
varying policies that might affect infant birth outcomes; these controls are in the vector P.  We 
include a simulated variable to account for changes in public health insurance eligibility.  It is 
constructed the same way as Currie and Gruber (1996). Using a 1990 national sample, we calculate 
for each state and each year the percent of infant and children who would be eligible for Medicaid 
or State Child Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP). This variable varies only by legislative 
generosity within each state and over time, which does not capture the demographic characteristics 
of an actual state population that might affect infant health outcomes. We also control for the 
maximum Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Temporary Aid to Needy Families 
(TANF) benefit for a 3-person family in each state and year. County-level control variables in the 
model are: annual unemployment rate, per capita personal income and population.10  We merge 
the data on bans and policy controls to the infant birth data by state/county of infant birth and 
quarter/year of conception, which is imputed using birth month, birth year and weeks of 
gestation.11 The summary statistics of smoking bans, cigarette taxes and other state level controls 
are presented in Table 1. 
                                                           
9 We are only able to run this model using a sub-sample restricted to pregnant women living in large counties 
(population>250,000).    
10 All monetary values are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2000 dollars. 
11 The pregnant women are considered to be covered by the ban only when the implementation of the ban happens 
before or at the time of conception. If the ban is implemented during the pregnancy, the woman is considered not 






5.1 Baseline Results 
We first estimate the effect of smoking bans on infant birth weight. The first three columns 
of Table 3 present results from reduced form OLS models for all maternal age groups when the 
dependent variable is birth weight in grams12. In the first row of Table 3, three types of bans are 
collapsed into a single variable denoting the existence of any type of ban. We create this Any Ban 
variable because there is a certain amount of collinearity in the adoption of different types of bans 
at the municipal and county level.  However, the two major types of ban – restaurant/bar ban and 
workplace ban – also enter into the model separately to show each individual effect, and the results 
are presented in the second and third rows of the table.13  Our results show that smoking bans do 
not have any significant effect on mean birth weight for any of the maternal age groups. 
Theoretically, the insignificant effect of Any Ban on birth weight could be because no types of 
bans have significant effects or because different types of bans have opposite effects that cancel 
one another out.  The lack of significant results in the second and third rows of Table 3, in which 
restaurant/bar and workplace bans enter the model separately, supports the first explanation. The 
                                                           
bans, to improve the precision of estimation, we drop those women to examine the robustness of our results. We find 
the significance of our results does not change.  
12 All of our models estimated below include real state-level cigarette tax per pack, state and county-level control 
variables described in the previous section, and a full set of demographic control variables.   
13 For all the outcomes, we also estimate the models when restaurant/bar bans and workplace bans enter into the 
equation simultaneously.  The results, similar to those shown in our baseline models, are not reported in the paper but 
are available upon request.  
67 
 
results for the other individual, state, and county level variables are presented in Appendix A.  State 
and county level controls, including taxes, have very few significant effects.14 
Previous studies have shown that anti-smoking policies can have non-linear effect on birth 
weight (e.g., Evan and Ringel 1999).  If these policies only affect the most at-risk mothers, there 
might be policy effects on the incidence of LBW and VLBW, even though smoking policies do 
not affect birth weight at the mean.  The results for probability of LBW and VLBW are in Columns 
4-6 and 7-9 of Table 3, respectively.  The results in the first row suggest that having any type of 
smoking ban is associated not with a decrease but with an increase of the probability of both LBW 
and VLBW for infants born to younger mothers (14-24). The estimates imply that a change from 
0 percent to 100 percent any ban coverage would result in a 1.3 percent (0.001/7.49%) increase in 
the incidence of LBW and 3 percent (0.0004/1.32%) increase in the incidence of VLBW for infants 
born to women between 14 and 24. The results in the second row indicate that a change from 0 
percent to 100 percent coverage by restaurant/bar bans would lead to a 3 percent increase in the 
incidence of VLBW infants born to mothers younger than 25. The results for workplace bans, 
presented in the third row, are similar to those in the first. While these percentage increases may 
appear small, they are likely to be economically significant in light of the enormous private and 
public costs associated with VLBW, in particular.   
 An infant health outcome that can be an important cause of low birth weight and also a 
potential health issue of its own is length of gestation. Our results for length of gestation in weeks 
are presented in the first three columns of Table 4. The overall gestation effect of smoking bans, 
as measured in the first row using the Any Ban variable, is insignificant.  When the two types of 
                                                           
14 Cigarette taxes do have significant, positive effects on birth weight for several vulnerable sub-groups, such as 
teenagers and younger black mothers.  These results are available upon request. 
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smoking bans enter into the equation separately (see rows 2 and 3 of Table 4), we continue to find 
that neither type of bans are significantly associated with the length of gestation.   
 Noting that the estimates of the birth weight effects of smoking bans were different at the 
mean and the lower tail of the distribution, we also estimate linear probability models to examine 
whether or not smoking bans decrease the incidence of low gestation. The results in Columns 3-6 
of Table 4 show no significant correlation between smoking policies and the probability of low 
gestation.  
We next estimate the effect of smoking bans on the probability of a five-minute APGAR 
score being below 7.  The results in the Columns 7-9 of Table 4 show that smoking bans do not 
have any significant effect on low APGAR scores.  Approximately 97 percent of the infants in our 
sample have normal range APGAR scores, so it is difficult to detect any significant effect of bans.    
Finally, we estimate a model to see whether there is a significant relationship between 
smoking bans and the incidence of cleft lip/palate.  The results do not indicate that there is an effect 
for Any Ban, but there is a positive and significant coefficient on Workplace Ban in the second row 
of Table 4.  Although the magnitude of this effect, a 0.02 percent increase, appears to be small, the 
underlying incidence of cleft palate (0.07 percent of all births) is so low that this is a meaningful 
one.   
 
5.2 Results for Stratified Samples 
Previous research has documented significant differences in birth outcomes for black and 
white infants, so we stratify our sample by race and present the results for the outcomes LBW and 
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VLBW in the first four columns of Table 5.15 We do not find any significant effect of smoking 
bans on infant health for either black or white infants.  We also estimate the models for three 
vulnerable sub-groups: teenage mothers (14-19), black teenage mothers, and mothers with low 
levels of education. For the teenage mothers and black teenagers, the results (shown in Columns 
5-8 of Table 5) indicate that both workplace bans and restaurants/bar bans are associated with 
significantly higher probability of VLBW, and the magnitude is larger than what we find in the 
baseline model.  For the group of mothers with high school level of education or below, we fail to 
find any significant effects of smoking bans on the probability of having LBW or VLBW infants 
(Columns 9-10 of Table 5).   
 
5.3 Specification Checks 
We perform several specification checks to test the robustness of our baseline results.16  
First, anti-smoking sentiments may bias our results.  If the passage of the clean indoor air laws in 
certain areas directly reflect more concern for health and distaste for smoking, then failing to 
control for differences in anti-smoking sentiment within state and over time will over-estimate the 
beneficial effects of smoking policies (DeCicca et al. 2008).  In our case, the potential detrimental 
effects of smoking bans on infant health will be under-estimated.  Following DeCicca et al. (2008), 
using data from Tobacco Use Supplement to the Current Population Survey (TUS-CPS) during 
the period 1995-2011, we include a direct measure of state-level anti-smoking sentiment as 
                                                           
15 The results for the other birth outcomes are not shown in the paper, but available upon request. We do not find any 
significant results for the other outcomes among white or black infants.  
16 Because of the number of outcomes we have and models we estimate, we only present the results for the outcomes 
of LBW and VLBW in a few specification checks of interest in Table 6. Other results are available upon request.  
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additional explanatory variables in our baseline model.17 This measure is based on responses to 
two questions on public attitudes towards smoking. In all TUS-CPS surveys during our study 
period, respondents were asked whether they think smoking should be allowed in bars and lounges, 
and whether they think smoking should be allowed at home. We create two variables – the 
percentage of people saying that smoking should not be allowed in bars and the percentage of 
people saying that smoking should not be allowed at home – to proxy for public attitudes towards 
smoking across states and over time. These variables are merged to the infant birth data based on 
state of residence and year of conception.  
As shown in the first two columns of Table 6, the positive association between smoking 
bans and the incidence of LBW and VLBW infants born to mothers aged less than 24 still exists 
and is significant. When smoking bans are specified as Any Ban in the first row, the results indicate 
that a 0 percent to 100 percent change in coverage by any type of smoking ban would lead to an 
increase in the probability of having LBW and VLBW infants born to young mothers, and the size 
of the effects is similar to that we find in our baseline models. When each type of smoking bans 
enters into the equation separately, we continue to find a significant, positive effect for the outcome 
of VLBW and the magnitude doesn’t change.  
Second, we estimate models in which we control for pre-natal care during pregnancy. We 
do not include this control in our baseline models because it is likely to be endogenous 
(Rosenzweig and Schultz 1983).  However, it may be an omitted variable if it affects smoking 
behavior during pregnancy and access varies by location and time. When we add a pre-natal care 
                                                           
17 DeCicca et al. (2008) provide an in-depth discussion of the benefits of controlling for anti-smoking sentiment and 
present a way to measure this sentiment. Since our study period is longer than DeCicca et al. (2008), and TUS-CPS 
asked different questions after 2003, we are only able to use the replies to two questions (instead of nine questions in 
their paper) to measure the anti-smoking sentiment.  
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variable to our models, we still do not find any effect of smoking bans on mean birth weight or 
length of gestation, but the positive correlation between Any Ban and the rate of LBW and VLBW 
become insignificant (See Columns 3-4 of Table 6).  However, pre-natal care is self-reported and 
incompletely reported in the birth certificate data, so this is not our preferred specification. 
Third, the potential multi-collinearity between cigarette taxes and smoking bans may affect 
the significance of our results. To assess whether or not the time trend for cigarette tax increases 
is collinear with the trend in state adoption of smoking bans, we both informally observe whether 
there is a tax hike at the time of adoption of bans, and formally test the collinearity by calculating 
variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF of workplace bans, bar/restaurant bans, and taxes are 
below 2.5, and the correlation between Any Ban and taxes is around 0.35, indicating no severe 
multi-collinearity. In addition, we replace the cigarette tax variable with a real cigarette price 
variable that includes taxes to test the robustness of results.18  The results, in Columns 5-6 of Table 
6, are not sensitive to this change. 
Finally, we address the fact that in our 2005-2009 data, counties of all sizes are identified, 
while in the pre-2005 data, counties with populations below 250,000 are not identified, and so 
those observations with unidentified counties before 2005 are dropped in our baseline 
specifications.  We estimate a set of models in which counties with populations below 250,000 
were dropped in all years in our sample and report our results in Columns 7-8 of Table 6.  Although 
the precision of the estimates falls slightly (some estimates are only significant at 10 percent level), 
the pattern of results is qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates.   In the last two columns of 
Table 6, we report the results when including the county-specific linear time trends as additional 
                                                           
18 Cigarette price data is from the Tax Burden on Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker 2011). The price is a weighted 
average after-tax price for a pack of 20 cigarettes, varying by state and by year. 
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controls and using only observations in large counties (pop>250,000). As we can see, the smoking 
bans are still associated with higher rates of LBW and VLBW infants, although the significance 
level drops slightly. 
 
 
6. The Potential Mechanisms for the Effects of Smoking Bans on Infant Health 
Smoke-free laws are designed to discourage smoking and decrease the intake of second-
hand smoke; in general, both would be expected to be clinically beneficial for pregnant women.  
At the same time, there are several possible explanations for the adverse health effects estimated 
in the previous section.  The most likely explanation is increased exposure to second-hand smoke 
due to bans. This kind of change in the place of smoking is consistent with the findings of Adda 
and Cornaglia (2010). Alternately, pregnant women might be more likely to stay in the labor force 
after a workplace ban has been implemented or frequent bars or restaurants more often, all else 
equal.19  Either of these scenarios would explain the adverse effect of bans on LBW and VLBW 
that we find in several specifications. 
In this study of birth certificate records, which do not contain information on household 
structure or employment, we are limited in our ability to test all of these hypotheses.  However, as 
one way of trying to disentangle the mechanism for these effects, we estimate a model in which 
the dependent variable is whether or not a mother reported smoking during pregnancy. As shown 
in Table 7, we find that smoking bans are not significantly associated with a reduction in smoking 
for pregnant women, which is consistent with our finding of no clinically beneficial effects of bans.  
                                                           
19 Baum (2005) does not find any significant negative effects of working while pregnant, although a number of clinical 
studies document adverse effects of specific working conditions, including those requiring heavy lifting, exposure to 
chemicals, and other hazards. 
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To further test whether smoking status is a mediating factor in explaining the effects of bans, we 
add the maternal smoking during pregnancy variable to our baseline model. As expected, the 
results for the smoking bans do not change and the coefficient for smoking status is insignificant. 
All of these indicate that the effects of smoking bans on infant health do not work through the 
mechanism of decreasing maternal smoking.  
This lack of an infant health effect through maternal smoking status still does not explain 
the negative effects we find on LBW and VLBW; however, these negative impacts of smoking 
bans could be due to redistribution of second-hand smoke from workplaces and restaurants into 
the home. To try to tease out this mechanism, we estimate specifications of models in which we 
stratify the sample between mothers who reported smoking during pregnancy and those who did 
not.  The results shown in Table 8 suggest that the positive correlation between smoking bans and 
the incidence of LBW and VLBW exists only in non-smoker group.  Although this is not a perfect 
test for effects of second-hand smoke exposure, the results suggest that negative infant health 
outcomes associated with smoking ban implementation work through indirect rather than direct 
channels.   
Both of these analyses are limited attempts to understand the mechanism by which 
detrimental effects of smoking bans appear because the response rate to the smoking status 
question in the Natality Detail File is far from complete at 78 percent. This might explain why we 
fail to find any significant effects associated directly with smoking status.  Additionally, birth 
certificate records do not provide information on the household of a new mother, including the 
kind of information on smoking behavior of all household member that would be needed to directly 
test the place-of-smoking hypothesis.   Better understanding of the indirect health effects of 






In conclusion, we have estimated the effect of smoking bans in restaurants/bars, and 
workplaces on infant birth weight, length of gestation and several other indicators of health at birth. 
Overall, we find no evidence that smoking bans are associated with improvements of infant health 
outcomes. On the contrary, the results suggest that the coverage of at least one type of smoking 
bans is associated with an increase in the incidence of LBW and VLBW among infants born to 
mothers younger than 25.  A potential explanation for this negative effect is that pregnant women 
are exposed to more second-hand smoke after workplace bans are implemented because other 
household members smoke more in the home, an effect documented by Adda and Cornaglia (2010).     
Despite years of policy attention, smoking and infant health outcomes such as low birth 
weight remain important public health concerns in most parts of the world.  Our results suggest 
that bans on smoking in public places, which may have other amenity or adult health benefits, are 
not an effective way to reduce smoking during pregnancy or reduce smoking-attributable infant 
health problems.  In fact, it is possible that bans may actually have a moderate detrimental effect 
on infant health by increasing the exposure of pregnant women through indirect channels, such as 
increased exposure to second-hand smoke, or changes in employment patterns for pregnant women. 
A better understanding of the mechanisms for these indirect effects remains an important goal for 
future work.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Outcome and Policy Variables 
 
Mother's Age 14-24 25-34 35-45 All 
Birthweight (grams) 3238.48 3358.17 3360.10 3316.95 
 (564.03) (564.47) (602.68) (572.80) 
Low Birthweight (<2500g) 7.49% 5.50% 6.59% 6.34% 
 (0.26) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) 
Very Low Birthweight (<1500g) 1.32% 1.01% 1.31% 1.16% 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Gestation (weeks) 38.72 38.76 38.57 38.7165 
 (2.37) (2.13) (2.22) (2.23) 
Low Gestation (<37 weeks) 10.06% 8.40% 9.91% 9.19% 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29) 
Infant Mortality 0.76% 0.50% 0.57% 0.59% 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Low Apgar Score (<7) 3.20% 2.51% 2.81% 2.79% 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
Cleft Lip/Palate 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Mother Smoked ± 13.88% 8.04% 6.82% 9.89% 
 (0.35) (0.27) (0.25) (0.30) 
Cigarette Taxst    $0.65  $0.70  $0.74  $0.69 
 (0.45) (0.47) (0.49) (0.47) 
Any Banct 29.89% 31.68% 34.05% 31.40% 
 (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) 
AFDC/TANFst 378.86 403.25 420.75 397.30 
 (156.06) (154.54) (152.23) (155.43) 
Medicaid/SCHIPst 44.44 45.08 46.24 45.03 
 (13.80) (14.34) (14.65) (14.21) 
Unemploymentct 5.48% 5.24% 5.17% 5.32% 
 (2.13) (1.98) (1.90) (2.02) 
Per Capita Incomect $30,000  $32,000  $33,900  $31,600  
 (7723.08) (8763.90) (10000.00) (8713.14) 
County Populationct 1,330,000 1,360,000 1,450,000 1,360,000 
 (1,940,000) (1,910,000) (1,970,000) (1,930,000) 
N 13,918,429 20,491,501 5,744,190 40,154,120 
    Source: Infant birth outcomes are from U.S. Natality Detail File, 1995-2009. Tax data is from the Tax Burden 
on Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker 2011). AFDC/TANF is collected from Green Book (U.S. House of 
Representatives). Medicaid/SCHIP is constructed by authors following Currie and Gruber (1996). 
Unemployment data is from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Income and population data are from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. ±  Means and standard deviations for those who 
responded; response rates are 77% (14-24); 81% (25-34); 78% (35-44); 78% (all).  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Birth Certificate Demographic Variables 
 
 Mother's Age 14-24 25-34 35-45 All 
Mom Age 20.74 29.26 37.41 27.47 
 (2.40) (2.78) (2.27) (6.18) 
Mom Hispanic 30.88% 21.24% 16.97% 23.97% 
 (0.46) (0.41) (0.38) (0.43) 
Mom Black 23.22% 12.91% 11.79% 16.32% 
 (0.42) (0.34) (0.32) (0.37) 
Mom Other Non-White 3.81% 7.58% 8.33% 6.38% 
 (0.19) (0.26) (0.28) (0.24) 
Mom’s Race Missing 0.75% 0.96% 1.16% 0.91% 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Mom Educ <8 yrs 7.39% 5.35% 5.23% 6.04% 
 (0.26) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) 
Mom Educ 8-11 yrs 29.58% 8.43% 5.30% 15.31% 
 (0.46) (0.28) (0.22) (0.36) 
Mom Educ 13-15 yrs 19.33% 24.85% 21.94% 22.52% 
 (0.39) (0.43) (0.41) (0.42) 
Mom Educ 16+yrs 3.82% 35.53% 46.16% 26.06% 
 (0.19) (0.48) (0.50) (0.44) 
Mom Educ Missing 0.64% 0.62% 0.79% 0.65% 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Mom Married 35.12% 76.44% 82.94% 63.05% 
 (0.48) (0.42) (0.38) (0.48) 
Prenatal Care Starts (Trimester) 1.31 1.16 1.14 1.21 
 (0.60) (0.46) (0.43) (0.51) 
# Prenatal Care Visits 10.67 11.55 11.68 11.26 
 (4.13) (3.82) (3.97) (3.98) 
1st child 57.90% 34.12% 23.35% 40.82% 
 (0.49) (0.47) (0.42) (0.49) 
3rd child 9.91% 18.86% 22.45% 16.27% 
 (0.30) (0.39) (0.42) (0.37) 
4th child 2.77% 7.65% 11.05% 6.45% 
 (0.16) (0.27) (0.31) (0.25) 
5th child 0.90% 4.76% 10.61% 4.26% 
 (0.09) (0.21) (0.31) (0.20) 
Birth Order Missing 0.58% 0.53% 0.59% 0.56% 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Male Child 51.20% 51.22% 51.17% 51.20% 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 








Table 3. Baseline Ban Effects for Birth Weight, Low Birth Weight, and Very Low Birth Weight 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Mother Age 14-24 25-34 35-45 14-24 25-34 35-45 14-24 25-34 35-45 
Outcome BW (g) BW (g) BW (g) LBW LBW LBW VLBW VLBW VLBW 
 
Any Ban -0.8954 0.4597 0.9906 0.0010* 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0004* -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.57) (0.29) (0.57) (2.59) (0.75) (-0.27) (2.14) (-0.24) (-0.08) 
 
Restaurant/ 1.6462 1.8550 2.5041 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0004* 0.0000 -0.0002 
Bar Ban (0.65) (0.84) (1.20) (0.51) (0.52) (-0.87) (2.54) (0.02) (-0.77) 
 
Workplace -1.9251 0.4556 1.2995 0.0010 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0004* 0.0000 -0.0002 





















** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level.  T-statistics are in parenthesis. All models also include: mother age, race, ethnicity, education, 
marital status; parity of birth; sex of child; county population, per capita income and unemployment rate; state AFDC/TANF benefit and Medicaid/SCHIP 







Table 4. Ban Effects for Gestation, APGAR, and Cleft Lip, by Mother’s Age 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Mother Age 14-24 25-34 35-45 14-24 25-34 35-45 14-24 25-34 35-45 14-24 25-34 35-45 
Outcome GES 
 
GES GES LGES LGES LGES APGAR APGAR APGAR Cleft Lip Cleft Lip Cleft Lip 
 
Any Ban 0.0033 0.0107 0.0119 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0010 0.0034 0.0016 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.21) (0.63) (0.79) (0.09) (-1.09) (1.25) (1.28) (0.81) (0.20) (0.82) (-1.23) (0.99) 
 
Restaurant/ 0.0134 0.0170 0.0196 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0015 0.0020 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
Bar Ban (0.82) (0.96) (1.35) (-0.82) (-1.14) (-1.66) (0.72) (0.28) (-0.29) (0.57) (-1.60) (0.45) 
 
Workplace -0.0094 -0.0002 0.0027 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0022 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001* 



























** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. T-statistics are in parenthesis. All models also include: mother age, race, ethnicity, education, 
marital status; parity of birth; sex of child; county population, per capita income and unemployment rate; state AFDC/TANF benefit and Medicaid/SCHIP 








Table 5. Ban Effects Stratified by Race, Age and Education 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 White Black Teen  Black Teen Low Education 
Outcome LBW VLBW LBW VLBW LBW VLBW LBW VLBW LBW VLBW 
   
Any Ban -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0008 0.0010 0.0008* 0.0015 0.0017* 0.0005 0.0000 
 (-0.87) (-1.24) (-0.91) (-0.92) (1.39) (2.17) (1.02) (2.15) (1.19) (0.05) 
   
Restaurant -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0004 0.0008* 0.0014 0.0020* -0.0000 0.0000 
\Bar Ban (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.49) (0.21) (0.51) (2.28) (0.93) (2.62) (-0.07) (0.17) 
   
Workplace 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0014 0.0009* 0.0016 0.0019* 0.0005 0.0000 
Ban (0.43) (0.24) (-0.04) (0.21) (1.80) (2.48) (1.10) (2.09) (0.69) (0.13) 
           
N 20,307,031 20,307,031 6,109,409 6,109,409 4,293,465 4,293,465 1,197,561 1,197,561 20,387,713 20,387,713 
** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. T-statistics are in parenthesis. All models also include: mother age, ethnicity, education, marital 
status; parity of birth; sex of child; county population, per capita income and unemployment rate; state AFDC/TANF benefit and Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility 






Table 6. Specification Checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Specification 1: 
Control for Smoking 
Sentiment 
Specification 2: 
Control for Prenatal 
Care 
Specification 3: Control 
for Cigarette Price 
instead of Tax 
Specification 4: 
Restrict Sample to 
Large Counties 
Specification 5: With 
County-Specific 
Trend 
Outcome LBW VLBW LBW VLBW LBW VLBW LBW VLBW LBW VLBW 
Mother Age 14-24 14-24 14-24 14-24 14-24 14-24 14-24 14-24 14-24 14-24 
   
Any Ban 0.0012* 0.0005* 0.0003 0.0000 0.0010* 0.0004± 0.0011* 0.0004± 0.0010* 0.0004± 
 (2.48) (2.10) (0.32) (0.12) (2.07) (1.87) (2.26) (1.70) (2.30) (1.77) 
   
Restaurant 0.0005 0.0005** 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0004* 0.0019 0.0004* 
\Bar Ban (1.16) (2.75) (0.27) (0.82) (0.43) (2.38) (0.40) (2.29) (0.45) (2.17) 
   
Workplace 0.0010± 0.0004* 0.0007 0.0001 0.0010 0.0004± 0.0013 0.0004± 0.0011 0.0004± 
Ban (1.71) (2.08) (0.53) (0.28) (1.67) (1.90) (1.84) (1.82) (1.63) (1.85) 
           
N 13,918,429 13,918,429 13,224,197 13,224,197 13,918,429 13,918,429 10,837,912 10,837,912 10,837,912 10,837,912 
** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. ± Significant at the 10% level.  T-statistics are in parenthesis. All models also include: mother age, 
ethnicity, education, marital status; parity of birth; sex of child; county population, per capita income and unemployment rate; state AFDC/TANF benefit and 






Table 7. Ban Effects on Whether Mother Smoked During Pregnancy, by Age 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 14-24 25-34 35-45 
Outcome Smoked Smoked Smoked 
Any Ban -0.0003 0.0001 0.0021 
 (-0.10) (0.03) (1.08) 
    
Restaurant 0.0012 0.0002 0.0037 
\Bar Ban (0.28) (0.06) (1.73) 
    
Workplace  -0.0024 -0.0005 -0.0015 
Ban (-0.70) (-0.24) (-0.76) 
    
N 13,918,429 20,491,501 5,744,190 
** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis. All models also include: mother age, ethnicity, education, marital status; 
parity of birth; sex of child; county population, per capita income and unemployment 
rate; state AFDC/TANF benefit and Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility measure; county and 






Table 8. Ban Effects Stratified by Mother’s Reported Smoking Status 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 14-24 25-34 35-46 14-24 25-34 35-46 
 Non-smokers Non-smokers Non-smokers Smokers  Smokers Smokers 
Outcome BW (g) BW (g) BW (g) BW (g) BW (g) BW (g) 
Any Ban -2.1308 -0.4676 -0.4388 -0.6335 0.0898 -2.2095 
 (-1.29) (-0.13) (-0.26) (-0.15) (0.04) (-0.36) 
       
Outcome LBW LBW LBW LBW LBW LBW 
Any Ban 0.0020** 0.0009* 0.0006 0.0014 0.0001 0.0017 
 (3.24) (2.25) (1.88) (0.83) (0.10) (0.52) 
       
Outcome VLBW VLBW VLBW VLBW VLBW VLBW 
Any Ban 0.0006*** 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0003 















***Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. T-statistics are 
in parenthesis. All models also include: mother age, race, ethnicity, education, marital status; parity of birth; 
sex of child; county population, per capita income and unemployment rate; state AFDC/TANF benefit and 















Appendix Table 1. Coefficients for Individual Control Variables, all Policy and County 
Characteristic Variables: Birth Weight Models 
Mother’s Age 14-24 25-34 35-45 
Outcome BW (g) BW (g) BW (g) 
Any Banct -0.8954 0.4597 0.9906 
 (-0.57) (0.29) (0.57) 
Mom Age 8.6689*** -0.2447 -8.1603*** 
 (14.84) (-1.63) (-19.59) 
Mom Hispanic -27.8150*** -19.2341*** -28.9358*** 
 (-5.86) (-4.18) (-5.56) 
Mom Black -190.2260*** -210.9928*** -238.2339*** 
 (-40.17) (-32.92) (-27.54) 
Mom Other  -120.2343*** -175.4238*** -164.0369*** 
Non-White (-6.24) (-21.57) (-30.22) 
Mom Edu<8 -20.5404*** 17.4632** 31.0553*** 
 (-4.23) (3.27) (6.34) 
Mom Edu 8-11  -31.3293*** -40.3134*** -47.0533*** 
 (-10.00) (-5.51) (-4.57) 
Mom Edu 13-15 29.8958*** 34.6638*** 43.2286*** 
 (11.71) (13.95) (15.44) 
Mom Edu 16+ 46.1847*** 67.0804*** 90.3018*** 
 (11.82) (15.50) (18.57) 
Mom Married 40.4126*** 75.1733*** 106.5997*** 
 (13.53) (14.55) (13.79) 
1st Child -43.3547*** -99.0247*** -121.2960*** 
 (-15.46) (-56.74) (-47.48) 
3rd Child -19.2232*** 12.0210*** 32.4250*** 
 (-10.20) (7.72) (37.68) 
4th Child -48.2554*** 3.6987 49.6900*** 
 (-17.35) (1.05) (32.74) 
5th Child -80.2204*** -18.6504*** 74.3996*** 
 (-29.05) (-3.54) (17.92) 
Male 103.5531*** 115.0347*** 115.0540*** 
 (84.87) (93.89) (70.87) 
Cigarette Taxst 3.3249 0.2372 -0.1657 
 (1.27) (0.11) (-0.06) 
AFDC/TANFst  -0.1102* -0.0477 -0.0390 
 (-2.51) (-1.31) (-1.26) 
Medicaid/SCHIPst 0.0270 -0.0395 -0.1340 
 (0.29) (-0.63) (-1.67) 
Unemploymentct 0.1232 0.2970 0.3958 
 (0.17) (0.37) (0.62) 
Per Capita Incct 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
 (1.01) (0.46) (0.37) 
Populationct -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.79) (-1.51) (-1.70) 
Observations 13,918,423 20,491,502 5,744,195 
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. T-
statistics are in parenthesis. All models also include mom education missing, mom race missing, and 
birth order missing variables, but the coefficients are not reported here. The omitted categories are: 
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Over the past two decades, there has been rapid growth in the immigrant population in the 
United States; the number of immigrants has increased from 19.8 million to 38.1 million during 
the period 1990 to 2007 (Fortuny and Chaudry 2009). This dramatic increase has fueled a rise in 
the share of children with immigrant parents. In 2007, children of immigrants represented more 
than one in five American children (Fortuny and Chaudry 2009). The gap in educational 
achievement between the children of immigrants and their native peers is well documented 
(Schnepf 2007; Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This gap appears to start at a very early age and persist 
into adulthood. For example, data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress in 2008 
shows that the average reading score gap between white students and Hispanic students was 
roughly 10 percent for students aged 9-, 13- and 17-years-old (Rampney et al. 2009). A relatively 
smaller gap was also found for math scores: 7 percent for 9-year-old students, and 8 percent for 
13- and 17-year-old students. These figures raise serious concerns about immigrants’ ability to 
assimilate into the US economy because this education is an important precondition for them to 
integrate. (Schnepf 2007). From a policy perspective, it is also necessary for governments to 
support a productive and highly qualified workforce that will meet the challenges of an aging 
population (Colding et al. 2009).  
The majority of children of immigrants are exposed to a multi-lingual environment, and 
many of them report that their primary language spoken at home is not English. For example, using 
Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) data, Dustmann et al. (2011) find that 62.3 percent of 
children of immigrants are language minority students (or students who speak a foreign language 
at home and have English as an additional language). Given that home learning environment 
affects student academic achievement, it is not surprising that the literature finds that among many 
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factors (such as parental socioeconomic status and school characteristics), language environment 
at home—specifically, whether the primary language spoken at home is English—is one of the 
most important factors in explaining the test score gap (for example, Schnepf 2007). However, in 
most previous studies, language environment at home is usually modeled only as a control variable. 
Its importance is measured by how much the immigrant status effect on educational achievement 
shrinks after controlling for languages spoken at home. Although these studies imply that language 
environment at home can play a significant role in promoting students’ academic success, the 
estimated relationship between language spoken at home and school performance has not been of 
primary interest. More importantly, the issue of endogeneity is often ignored, and this may bias 
the estimates. For example, students speaking only English at home may have parents who care 
more about child education and are able to provide more help to their children in academics. 
Without controlling for these unobserved characteristics, the OLS estimates are biased.   
Our paper is among the first to attempt to fill this gap. Specifically, we focus on estimating 
the causal effect of language environment at home, measured by whether one speaks a language 
other than English at home, on students’ test scores during early childhood. The data used in this 
paper comes from Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K). 
Using the confidential ECLS-K data that allow us to match zip codes to county codes in the 
American Community Survey, we are able to exploit the variation in local language environment 
and augment this external instrument with a novel internal instrumental variables (IV) approach 
developed in Lewbel (2012), to isolate the causal effects. We reach several conclusions. First, we 
find that speaking a language other than English at home has a sizable, negative impact on reading 
test scores in both third and fifth grades, but has no effect on math scores in either grade. Second, 
there is no evidence that speaking a language other than English at home has any effect on the 
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growth rate of test scores from the third to the fifth grade, regardless of the subject. This suggests 
that any significant negative effect we find on reading test scores in the fifth grade is a result of 
the gap in the third grade. A non-English-language environment at home does not increase or 
decrease the test score gap between English users and non-English users from the third grade to 
the fifth grade. Third, the pattern in the effects of language environment remains unchanged 
whether the foreign language is Spanish or another language. Finally, our results also indicate that 
the effects of language environment at home differ by gender. Speaking a language other than 
English at home decreases the scores of girls on both reading and math tests, while for boys, this 
detrimental effect only exists for reading scores.  
The literature has generally found that cognitive and non-cognitive skills developed in 
early childhood can have a long-lasting impact on future educational and labor market outcomes 
(Keane and Wolpin 1997; Keane and Wolpin 2001; Cameron and Heckman 2001; Heckman 2008). 
Therefore, our results raise concerns about the long-term well-being of the children of immigrants 
whose primary language at home is not English, and may suggest the need for potential policy 
interventions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
discusses the potential mechanisms through which language environment at home could affect test 
scores. Section 3 presents the empirical methods. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 reports 




2. Literature Review 
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In this section we review two streams of the literature on the relationship between 
bilingualism and school performance. We first provide a review of the competing theories that 
have been put forth to explain an association between language environment at home and 
children’s academic achievement. We categorize them by whether or not the association is a direct 
one. We then review some of the related empirical literature.  
 
2.1 Links between Language Spoken at Home and Academic Achievement 
2.1.1 Direct Effects 
Language spoken at home may affect school performance directly by influencing the 
fundamental aspects of cognitive and neural development of children. A substantial body of 
research in linguistics and sociology has evaluated the effect of foreign language study or 
bilingualism on child cognitive development. There are two opposing views on the relationship 
between bilingualism and cognitive development: (1) the subtractive view, and (2) the additive 
view. 
The subtractive view emphasizes the negative effect of bilingualism and second language 
learning on cognitive development of children. This view was particularly popular in studies 
before 1970s. Researchers have argued that second language users are less effective in processing 
two languages at the same time (August and Hakuta 1997; Diaz 1983). They argue that human 
beings naturally begin with one language; therefore, a child has an extra cost of speaking an 
additional language because she usually needs to transfer “code” from the first language to the 
second language. During the process of transferring, the child may confuse herself both 
linguistically and cognitively, especially a child who has just begun to learn a second language. 
Additionally, speakers of multiple languages need separate systems to process different languages, 
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so that using one language interferes with using the other  (for reviews, see Cook 1997; Bialystok 
et al. 2012). More recently, researchers have provided the evidence that monolinguals generally 
perform better than bilinguals on verbal tasks, such as identifying and naming pictures more 
rapidly, because bilinguals master a smaller vocabulary in each language than monolinguals 
(Bialystok 2009; Pelham and Abrams 2014). This finding suggests a potential negative effect of 
bilingualism on students’ oral and written language development.  
The additive view, on the other hand, emphasizes the positive effect of bilingualism on 
cognitive development. It holds that knowing a second language improves rather than shrinks 
cognitive capability and leads to higher levels of metalinguistic awareness (Hakuta 1986; 
Bialystok 1999; Bialystok and Martin 2004). By learning another language, a student can improve 
writing and speaking skills, and even sharpen the awareness of the first language because more 
attention is paid to pronunciation and grammar, which may be hardly noticed when using only the 
native language (Bialystok 2013; Homel et al. 2014). Additionally, using multiple languages 
improves divergent thinking, which values flexibility, originality and fluency, increases creativity, 
and facilitates analogical reasoning (Bialystok 2007; Yoshida 2008; Abutalebi and Clahsen 2015). 
2.1.2 Indirect Effects 
English skill is another way through which languages spoken at home could indirectly 
affect students’ academic performance. Some immigrant parents speak English at home with the 
purpose of helping their children to learn English. The economics literature has found that speaking 
English at home improves language proficiency within immigrant families (for example, see 
Chiswick et al. 2005). The psychobiology literature generally finds that younger children learn 
language more easily than adolescents. It is widely believed that there is a “critical period” age 
range in which learning English happens naturally and can be considered as a natural ability for 
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children (Bleakley and Chin 2004). While there is no general consensus on the critical period age 
range, most studies find supportive evidence for the critical period hypothesis, with a range 
between age 5 and age 15 (Chiswick and Miller 2008). In our sample, all children fall into this 
range. Thus, it is possible that learning English takes place within households. If that is the case, 
children of immigrants would benefit from speaking English at home, and even may perform better 
in cognitive tests. Although this indirect effect may exist, it is important to be aware that all 
language minority students in our sample have passed an English screening test, and so schools 
believe that their English skills do not affect the understanding of the cognitive tests. Therefore, 
the effect of languages used at home on test scores found in our sample captures more than merely 
English skills. 
In addition to this language skill effect, language environment at home may affect non-
cognitive development, and eventually influence children’s academic performance. For immigrant 
families, using the native language of parents at home may have beneficial effects for children by 
promoting verbal interaction and complexity of communications between immigrant parents and 
their young children (Greenspan 1997).  
The discussion here is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead, we want to highlight the 
possibly important role of language environment at home in determining children’s academic 
achievement. This in turn motivates us to provide a first attempt to empirically examine this issue. 
 
2.2 Related Empirical Literature 
Our paper is closely related to two strands of the empirical literature. First, a growing 
literature has attempted to estimate the relationship between bilingualism and test scores among 
young adults. Using data on students from Brigham Young University (BYU) who were sent to 
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Mormon missions randomly and had to learn the foreign language of their mission’s location, Pope 
(2008) compares the difference in GPA for students who served foreign-speaking missions relative 
to students who served English-speaking missions. Pope fails to find evidence that students who 
were assigned to speak a foreign language perform better than students who were assigned to speak 
English. While this study, based on randomized experiments, provides some convincing results, 
the results cannot necessarily be generalized to younger children, who are the focus of this paper.  
Another strand of the literature focuses on the relationship between language proficiency 
and academic achievement among immigrants (Dustmann et al. 2010; Dustmann and Trentini 2008; 
Schnepf 2007). Most immigrants face a language obstacle that could potentially impact their 
academic performance at school. Dustmann et al. (2010) find that language is the single most 
important factor in explaining why the achievement gap between ethnic minority pupils and white 
British pupils decreases over time, using national pupil data from the UK. In the United States, 
one of the hotly debated issues is whether to provide language minority students with a bilingual 
education system or to immerse them in a purely English environment. Several studies have 
examined the effectiveness of using native language instruction for limited English proficient 
students, but they reach different conclusions. Chin et al. (2013) look at the impact of bilingual 
education programs in Texas on student development. They find that bilingual education programs 
do not improve test scores for limited English proficiency students. Slavin et al. (2011) and 
Matsudaira (2005) also provide the evidence that native language instruction neither helps 
language minority students improve English skills nor enhances their cognitive development. 
However, Greene (1998) conducts a meta-analysis by summarizing 11 studies, and finds that using 





3. Empirical Methods 
Before estimating the impact of speaking a language other than English at home on test 
scores, we first discuss a framework of potential outcomes to motivate our estimators. To begin 
with, let % and J denote two test scores to be compared. Specifically, % represents the test score 
that a student i would get if she spoke a language other than English at home, while J is the test 
score that student i would receive if she spoke English at home. In practice, only the data for one 
of the two test scores is collected; thus, one is the true score, and the other is a hypothetical score. 
The structural relationship between potential outcomes and the choice of language spoken at home 
is as follows: 
8% = 9 + @8 + B%(8) + K8%      (1) 
8J = 9 + BJ(8) + K8J     (2) 
28 =  L1  8C + D8 > 00    Mℎ=N OP=      (3) 
where 8 is a vector of exogenous observable characteristics; @8 represents the effect of speaking 
a language other than English at home on test scores; B8%  and B8J  capture the unobservable 
determinants of test scores; and 28 is a dummy variable indicating whether the language spoken at 
home is English, and equal to 1 if speaking a language other than English and zero otherwise. The 
observed test scores for student i could be expressed as 8 = 288% + (1 − 28)8J. 
In this set-up, the effect of speaking a non-English language at home is given by 8% − 8J, 
which varies from person to person. Here, we focus on the average treatment effect (ATE), which 
is /[8% − 8J]. If we assume: (1) constant effects of observables across families speaking English 
and families not speaking English at home, B%(8) =  BJ(8) = 8>; (2) common unobservables 
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across the two different home environments, K8% = K8J = K8 ; and (3) constant home language 
effect across individuals, @8 = @, the ATE simplifies to: 
/[8% − 8J] = /[(9 + @8 + B%(8) + K8%) − (9 + BJ(8) + K8S)] 
        = /[(9 + @ + 8> + K8) − (9 + 8> + K8)] 
   = @          (4) 
Under these assumptions, the observed test score 8  can be estimated using the following 
regression model: 
 8 = 288% + (1 − 28)8J 
= 28(9 + @8 + B%(8) + K8%) + (1 − 28)(9 + BJ(8) + K8J) 
= 28(9 + @8 + 8> + K8) + (1 − 28)(9 + 8> + K8) 
          = 9 + @28 + 8> + K8        (5) 
 
3.1 OLS Model 
The most common estimator used to identify the effect of language environment at home 
on child school performance is the Ordinary Least Squares estimator, which is given by @8  in 
Equation (5). The estimate of @8  will only be unbiased if there are no other unobservable 
characteristics correlated with both children’s test scores and the choice of language spoken at 
home. In other words, in Equation (5), if conditional on 8 , 28  is independent of K8  or 
/[K8|28; 8] = 0, then we can consistently estimate the ATE (@8) by OLS. 
Consistent and unbiased OLS estimation assumes that the choice of language spoken at 
home is independent of other unobservable factors within the households. However, in the real 
world, the decision about whether or not to speak English at home is correlated with a number of 
factors, such as parents’ English proficiency, socioeconomic status, and preference for keeping 
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origin languages. Some of these factors are also correlated with children’s school performance, 
but are very difficult to observe and measure. For instance, parents’ English proficiency is an 
important factor in determining whether to speak English at home or not, and it will also affect 
how parents educate their children (such as whether they read stories in English to children), which 
would influence child test scores.  Another concern is that children’s English skills, which are 
correlated with their test scores, may affect parents’ choice of language used at home. For example, 
children’s poor school performance due to limited English skills could push parents to speak 
English at home so as to improve children’s school performance. Therefore, it is very likely that 
in Equation (5) /[K8|28; 8] ≠ 0; that is, there is an endogeneity issue, and the OLS estimator 
cannot deliver a consistent estimate. A typical strategy to address the endogeneity is to employ 
instruments.1 In the traditional instrumental variables (IV) approach, a valid instrument has the 
following two properties: (1) it is strongly correlated with the language spoken at home, and (2) it 
is not correlated with test scores other than through language spoken at home.  
One potential valid instrument is the county-level percentage of the population speaking a 
language other than English at home. Since this statistic represents the local language environment 
(such as local people’s preference of speaking and keeping their origin languages), it is expected 
to be correlated with our treatment variable—the decision on whether or not to speak English at 
home. It should also not to be correlated with unmeasured determinants of test scores. However, 
this external instrument would be invalid if it is a proxy for unobserved family-level environment 
in that area, or a proxy for school quality in that county. For instance, in counties with a high 
percentage of Hispanic immigrants who usually do not speak English at home, schools may 
                                                           
1 An instrumental variable approach can address the endogeneity caused by selection on unobservables and by reverse 
causality (see Sabia 2007).  
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provide second language (Spanish) instructions for students, which may affect children’s cognitive 
test scores taken in English. Unfortunately, we cannot test the exogeneity of this instrument 
empirically when only one instrument is available. Given concerns about the validity of this 
external instrument and the difficulty in finding other good instruments, we adopt a new 
identification strategy proposed by Lewbel (2012).  
 
3.2 Lewbel IV Strategy 
Built on earlier work (Vella and Verbeek 1997; Cragg 1997; King et al. 1994; Klein and 
Vella 2003), Lewbel (2012) develops a new IV strategy that proposes restrictions on second 
moments and exploits heteroskedasticity in the errors for identification. The intuition for this 
technique is that the identification is achieved through internal instruments, which are constructed 
using the deviation from the mean of a vector of independent variables interacted with the residuals 
from a regression on the potential endogenous variable. The most important assumption of this IV 
strategy is that the error terms from that regression are heteroscedastic.  
The Lewbel IV approach does not require an external instrumental variable and relaxes 
traditional assumptions by not requiring instruments to be unrelated to test scores. It has been 
widely used in cases in which other sources of identification such as external instruments are not 
available or are too weak (Sabia 2007; Kelly et al. 2014; and Millimet and Roy 2015). For example, 
Sabia (2007) adopts the Lewbel IV method to study the effect of body weight on adolescent 
academic performance given the concern that traditional instruments (biological mother’s obesity 
status and biological father’s status) might be correlated with the outcome (adolescent academic 
performance) directly. He first shows the existence of heteroskedasticy in the first-stage errors, 
and then constructs internal instruments using the deviation from the mean of all exogenous 
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variables interacted with the residuals. His IV results are consistent with results from OLS models 
and individual fixed effects models.  
Compared with conventional approaches, the Lewbel IV method exploits second moments 
to circumvent the need for instruments. It is useful when one is short of valid external instruments 
or traditional instruments are too weak (Mishra and Smyth 2015). The internal instruments can 
also be combined with external instruments to increase efficiency and be used to test for exogeneity 
(for example, see Mishra and Smyth 2015; Kelly et al. 2014). Therefore, in this paper, we first 
adopt a Lewbel IV approach, and then estimate an alternative model by supplementing these 
internal IVs with the external instrument to improve the strength of the instruments and maximize 
precision. 
Lewbel (2012) IVs are constructed using the two following equations: 
28 = 8W + X8       (6) 
8 = 9 + @28 + 8> + K8     (7) 
where the language spoken at home (28) is determined by a set of observable characteristics, 8, 
which also directly impact children’s test scores (such child gender, race), and 8 is the observed 
test scores. In Equation (6), X8 represents unobserved determinants of the language spoken at home, 
and it is correlated with K8 in the presence of endogeneity.  
The instruments are constructed as [?8 − /(?8)]X8, where ?8  can be equal to 8  or be a 
subset of 8. In practice, since the components of X8 cannot be observed, we replace them with 
residuals from the first-stage linear regression of 28 on 8. For a valid Lewbel IV approach, the 
following assumptions have to be satisfied: (1) ?8 are uncorrelated with the covariance of X8 and 
K8 (YMZ(?8, X8, K8) = 0); (2) ?8 are correlated with the variance of X8 (YMZ(?8, X8E) ≠ 0); and (3) X8 
is heteroskedastic. The first two assumptions are not testable, but they are standard assumptions 
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and are unlikely to be major issues in practice. The third assumption is nonstandard, and Breusch-
Pagan test is employed to examine the heteroskedasticity of errors terms.  
Empirically, the heteroskedasticity could come from many sources, such as child 
race/ethnicity, school type, school region, and county of origin.2 Here, we take child ethnicity as 
an example. As we know, on average, the pre-schools that Hispanic attend are not as good as those 
that non-Hispanic attend. Hispanic parents do not read to their children as often as non-Hispanic 
parents, and their children’s nutrition are not as good as non-Hispanics’. As a results, Hispanic 
children may have a higher opportunity cost in learning than non-Hispanic children. The variance 
of errors may still the same within Hispanic children and non-Hispanic children, respectively, but 
differ considerably between these two groups. 
The Lewbel IV model is estimated through the following process: (1) regress 28 on 8 and 
obtain error terms =8 , (2) construct internal instruments using [?8 − /(?8)]=8 ,  (3) use these 
instruments to estimate the test score model via the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method.3 It is 
important to note that the Lewbel estimates are potentially sensitive to the choice of ?8. There are 
no standard rules for the optimal selection of ?8. In this paper, following Millimet and Roy (2015), 
we select variables that are significantly correlated with the first-stage error variance (squares of 
residuals in practice). 
In an alternative model, we supplement these internal instruments with our external 
instrument, county-level percentage of the population speaking a language other than English at 
home, to increase estimation efficiency. Internal instruments are constructed exactly the same way 
                                                           
2 Baum (2006) says that in cross-sectional datasets, group membership is a common source of heteroskedasticity. 
Within each group, the assumption of homoskedasticity may still hold, but between groups, the variance usually 
differs. This group membership could be applied to workers in different industries or people from different states, for 
example.  
3 Note that equation (6) is not a first-stage model. It is a formular used to construct internal instruments. 
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as we did in the Lewbel IV approach. Equation (6) does not change. The only difference is that we 
use both internal IVs and external IV to estimate the test score model, which is Equation (7), via 
2SLS. For both approaches, we have more than one exclusion restrictions for the potentially 
endogenous variable 28. Therefore, overidentification tests are conducted empirically to examine 
whether it is appropriate to reject the null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with the 




Our data come from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-
99, which is a nationally representative survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Education. It 
followed a cohort of approximately 20,000 students from kindergarten through middle school. 
Specifically, the students were interviewed in the fall and spring of kindergarten (1999), the fall 
and spring of first grade (1999), the spring of third grade (2002), the spring of fifth grade (2004), 
and the spring of eighth grade (2007). This survey has been widely used in the studies that 
investigate determinants of children’s cognitive and non-cognitive development during early 
childhood (for example, Fryer and Levitt 2004; Claessens et al. 2009). It not only contains 
information about children’s early schooling performance and social and emotional development, 
but also includes interviews with parents, teachers and schools, and thus provides a rich set of 
information on family background, educational resources at home, and school characteristics. The 
ECLS-K is particularly suited for this research because it asks parents whether the primary 
language spoken at home is English, and it has language screening tests that examine children’s 
English proficiency. More importantly, the restricted use version of the data provides detailed 
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information about the exact type of language spoken at home and the country of birth. It also 
contains the county identifiers, which enables us to merge this data with state- or county-level 
information to conduct the IV analysis.  
In this paper, we focus on students in the third and fifth grades for two reasons. First, in 
the kindergarten year and first grade, a certain number of students from immigrant families (58 
percent in the fall of kindergarten) did not pass the Oral Language Development Scale (OLDS) 
test, which is a language screening assessment administered to students with language minority 
background (speaking a language other than English at home). This screener is used to determine 
whether a child’s English is good enough to receive cognitive tests in English. Only children who 
passed OLDS take math and reading tests.4 To estimate the direct impact of language environment 
on test scores, we need to tease out the effect of English skills on academic performance and also 
keep as many language minority students as possible. Thus, we start from the third grade, when 
almost all children of immigrants demonstrated sufficient English proficiency to participate in the 
cognitive tests. Second, to empirically estimate the impact of language environment at home on 
early childhood development, we need at least two years of students’ test scores, and the eighth 
grade is too late for an early childhood study. 
 
4.1 Key Dependent Variables 
Our primary outcome variables are reading and math standardized test scores. These two 
subjects reflect different dimensions of cognitive skills and thus allow us to test whether language 
spoken at home affects all types of cognitive skills equally. Specifically, reading tests measure 
                                                           
4 Students who did not pass English OLDS but spoke Spanish would take a Spanish language screening test. For 
children who passed the Spanish version of OLDS, math and reading tests were administered in Spanish. 
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basic skills (such as print familiarity, letter recognition, and sounds), vocabulary and 
comprehension. Math tests examine student skills in counting and comparing numbers, solving 
problems and interpreting graphs, which should not require as high a level of English proficiency 
as reading. In this paper, we utilize item response theory (IRT) scale scores for each subject, which 
measure children’s performance by incorporating the difficulty, discriminating ability, and guess-
ability of each question. IRT scores have advantages over simple test scores which only count the 
number of correct answers (Fryer and Levitt 2004). Most importantly, IRT scoring allows for 
longitudinal measurement of gain and growth in achievement over time, which is another focus of 
this paper. We standardize the IRT scores to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for 
the sample on each of the tests and time periods.5 This facilitates the comparison of our results to 
the impact of other important determinants on test scores examined in the literature.  
 
4.2 The Language Spoken at Home and Control Variables 
Our main independent variable is constructed from the survey question “what is the 
primary language spoken in your home,” which is directly asked of parents.6 We control for: (1) 
children’s own characteristics, including race/ethnicity, gender, age (in months), and birth weight; 
(2) parental and household characteristics, including father’s and mother’s education, log family 
                                                           
5 The raw IRT score is 0-212 for reading test, and 0-174 for math test. In our sample, reading test scores range from 
51 to 201 with a mean of 130 and a standard deviation of 27 in the third grade, and 65 to 204 with a mean of 153 and 
a standard deviation of 25 in the fifth grade. Math test scores range from 35 to 166 with a mean of 102 and a standard 
deviation of 24 in the third grade, and 50 to 171 with a mean of 126 and a standard deviation of 24 in the fifth grade. 
6 This question was asked in children’s kindergarten year and the first grade. We use the responses from the first grade 
because (1) the first grade responses have fewer missing values, and (2) some new students were added into the survey 
sample in the first grade, and their information was only available in the first grade. For those parents who replied to 
this question in both years, only 0.1% of them changed their answers, and we drop those observations.  
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income in children’s kindergarten year,7 8 number of books at home, ownership of a computer at 
home, number of siblings, and parents’ marital status; (3) school characteristics, including school 
type (public or private), school region (northeast, midwest, south, and west), school urbanicity 
(central city, urban fringe, or small town and rural areas), and a dummy variable indicating whether 
a student transferred from another school; and (4) child’s country of birth (U.S. or another country) 
and time at entrance to the U.S. (before or after age 3).  
The number of students participating in the ECLS-K survey is nearly 15,300 in the third 
grade and 11,800 in the fifth grade.9 We drop observations without math and reading test scores, 
which is about 1 percent of the sample. Students who did not pass the OLDS test in the spring of 
first grade10 and those with missing information on OLDS test are excluded as well (2.5 percent of 
the sample). We delete children who do not have information about the language spoken at home 
(4 percent of the sample). Observations with missing information on child, parent, and school 
characteristics are also dropped from the sample (17 percent of the sample).11 The only exception 
is that observations with missing values on fathers’ education are not deleted because a relatively 
large portion of the data (another 18 percent) has missing information on this variable. Instead, we 
                                                           
7 Following Elder and Jepsen (2011), we use the log of family income to better capture the nonlinear effect of family 
income on test scores. 
8 In only the kindergarten year parents were asked about the exact income value. In the following years income was 
coded into $5,000 income brackets (top-coded at $200,000). To test whether the results are robust to the year and type 
of income controlled, we run specification checks later by controlling for income in the year of third and fifth grade 
(using a set of dummies). We find that the results are quite robust to different specifications of income. 
9 In this longitudinal survey, the sample of respondents decreases with each round of data collection. This is mainly 
because some children moved out of the original sample schools, and only a subsample of movers were followed. 
10 We realize that there might be a selection bias from dropping the students who did not pass the language screening 
test from the sample. We might underestimate a negative effect of speaking a language other than English at home (or 
overestimate a positive effect) by excluding students who had low English skills. 
11 Later we run specification checks for our baseline models by adding the observations with missing values on child, 
parent and school characteristics back into the sample. The results change little when we add back observations with 
missing values.  
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create a dummy variable indicating the missing status, equal to 1 if fathers’ education is missing 
and zero otherwise. Children whose current geographical location cannot be identified or whose 
birth country is unknown are also deleted (1 percent of the sample). The final sample size is 10,521 
for the third grade and 8,757 for the fifth grade. 
 
4.3 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of test scores are reported in Table 1. Simple comparisons of average 
test scores across different languages spoken at home reveal that students who speak English at 
home academically outperform those who do not in every aspect. The differences between these 
two groups are large and statistically significant in students’ academic performance across both 
reading and math. In particular, the differences in reading test scores are as large as 0.44 and 0.45 
standard deviations in the third and fifth grade, respectively, and the differences in math test scores 
are 0.29 and 0.22 in these two grades.12 While the difference in reading scores increases slightly 
from the third to fifth grade, the difference in math scores decreases by a significant amount. Table 
2 compares child, parent, and school characteristics between the group who speak English at home 
and the group who speak other languages at home using the sample of the third grade.13 Examining 
the summary statistics of observable characteristics, we clearly see that students who speak English 
at home significantly differ from those who do not in most dimensions. This table highlights the 
importance of controlling for observables in our estimations. More importantly, it highlights the 
potential endogeneity problem, discussed above, that students speaking English at home may differ 
                                                           
12 In terms of raw scores, the differences in reading test scores are 11.88 and 11.25 in the third and fifth grade, which 
are about 9 percent and 7 percent of their means. The differences in math test scores are 6.96 and 5.28 in the third and 
fifth grade, which are about 7 percent and 4 percent of their means. 
13 Appendix Table (1) presents the summary statistics of the control variables for the sample of the fifth grade. 
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from students speaking other languages at home in unobservable dimensions. This issue may 
prevent us from drawing a causal interpretation from the OLS results. 
 
4.4 External Instrumental Variable 
The external instrumental variable used is the county-level percentage of the population (5 
years and older) speaking a language other than English at home. This information is collected in 
the American Community Survey (ACS), which is conducted annually by Census Bureau. The 
ACS asks each respondent the primary language spoken at home and provides county-level rates 
of a language other than English being spoken at home. We merge this data with our sample by 
using the confidential county-level geographic information in ECLS-K. Since the ACS only 
provides summary estimates for counties with 250,000 or more people in a population, we lose a 
part of the sample by merging these two data sets. As a result, only children from large counties 
are included in the baseline IV estimation. Later we use a similar state-level instrument to test the 




5.1 OLS Results on the Level of Test Scores 
We begin with a parsimonious set of covariates, and then expand that set of covariates. The 
results are reported in Table 3. Panel A presents estimates on test scores in the third grade. As 
shown in Column 1, for the model including only children’s basic demographic information and 
birth weight, we find that a non-English-language environment at home is correlated with a large, 
significant decrease in both reading and math scores. This is consistent with the raw differences of 
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test scores between the group speaking English at home and the group not speaking English 
presented in Table 1. We then include family and school characteristics sequentially into the 
specification. Information on country of birth and time of child immigration is captured in the last 
specification. As we can see in Columns 2, 3 and 4, the negative association, albeit smaller, 
remains sizable and significant for reading tests. In particular, in the model with a full set of 
controls, we find that speaking a language other than English at home is associated with a decrease 
of 0.34 standard deviation in reading scores.  By contrast, the association between a non-English-
language environment at home and math scores becomes much smaller and statistically 
insignificant once we control for family characteristics. 
Turning to the estimates on test scores in Grade 5, reported in Panel B of Table 3, we again 
see a similar pattern. Across all specifications, speaking a language other than English at home is 
significantly correlated with a decrease in reading scores. By comparing the estimates in the third 
grade to those in the fifth grade, we find that this negative correlation for reading test does not 
shrink or disappear over time. For the math test, we find a negative association between a non-
English-language home environment and test scores in the model controlling for only child 
characteristics. The significance of this negative association disappears while we control more 
variables.  
That the effect varies across specifications implies that these additional control variables 
are highly correlated with the type of languages spoken at home, which is consistent with the 
literature. By summarizing prior studies (Crawford 1997; Moss and Puma 1995), Hernandez (2007) 
finds that language-minority students are most likely to attend schools that have a high percentage 
of poor students and inexperienced teachers, and that they are over-represented in special 
education classes. Thus, it is important to control for these family and school characteristics so as 
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to identify a causal effect. However, even after conditioning on such a rich set of covariates, we 
may still fail to control for individual heterogeneity adequately. To address this endogeneity issue, 
we turn to IV estimates. 
 
5.2 IV Results on the Level of Test Scores 
Given that we cannot test the exogeneity, and therefore, the validity of our external 
instrument, and also to avoid the potential weak external instrument issue, we employ an internal 
IV approach proposed in Lewbel (2012). One important assumption of this approach is the 
presence of heteroskedastic errors in estimation of Equation (6). To test this assumption, we 
conduct the Breusch-Pagan test. As shown in the first two columns of Table 4, we are able to reject 
the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors at the [ ≤ 0.0001 level for models in both the third 
and the fifth grades.14 To construct internal instruments, we select variables that are significantly 
related to the variance of the errors in Equation (6). For the third grade sample, race/ethnicity 
(Hispanic, Asian, other), family income, school region (Midwest, South, West), school urbanicity 
(small town), and age at the entrance to the U.S. (older than three)  are included in ?8; and for the 
fifth grade sample, race/ethnicity (Hispanic, Asian, other), family income, ownership of computer, 
school region (South), school urbanicity (small town), and age at the entrance to the U.S. (older 
than three) are chosen.  
Before proceeding to the IV estimation, we test whether these internal instruments are 
strongly correlated with the choice of language spoken at home and whether they are exogenous 
to test scores. Results are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. A simple F test on excluded 
                                                           
14 In each grade, Equation (6) is the same for reading and math scores. Therefore, the heteroskedasticity result is the 
same for both subjects, and we report only once for each grade. 
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instruments is first performed to test for weak instruments. A rule of thumb of this test is that the 
F should be above 10 in order to reject the null of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock 1997). As 
shown in the first two columns, our F statistics are much larger than 10, indicating strong 
instruments. Another more formal weak identification test—the Gragg Donald test—is conducted 
as well, and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic is presented. According to Stock-Yogo critical 
values, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that instruments are weakly associated with the 
language spoken at home at [ ≤ 0.0001 level. Additionally, we perform an overidentification test 
to examine whether the excluded instruments are correlated with our outcomes: reading and math 
test scores. The Hansen J statistic and p-value shown in the Table 4 indicate a failure to reject the 
null hypothesis that the exclusion restriction is invalid. In other words, the exogeneity assumption 
is satisfied; our instruments do not appear to be correlated with test scores. Based on these test 
results, we argue that the internal instruments we construct have the important properties of good 
instruments. 
Panels A and B in Column 1 of Table 5 presents Lewbel IV estimates of the effect of a 
non-English-language home environment on test scores. 15  As shown in Panel A, speaking a 
language other than English at home reduces reading scores by 0.14 standard deviation16, while 
has no significant effect on math scores in the third grade. In the fifth grade, again, we can see that 
speaking a language other than English at home is associated with a decrease in reading scores and 
the magnitude is 0.17 standard deviation (shown in Panel B)17. The estimate for math scores is not 
                                                           
15 Appendix Table (2) presents first-stage estimation results. 
16 In terms of raw scores, this is a reduction of 3.78 at the mean of 130, which is about 3 percent of its mean. 
17 In terms of raw scores, this is a reduction of 5.28 at the mean of 126, which is about 3 percent of its mean. 
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statistically significant. These results are consistent with OLS results, but are relatively larger, 
which is common for IV estimates.  
To improve statistical power, we further supplement the internal instruments with an 
external instrument: the county-level percentage of the population speaking a language other than 
English at home. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report the coefficient on the external IV in the first-
stage model, and present results of various diagnostic tests on the validity of instruments. As shown, 
the statistically significant association between this county-level instrument and our potential 
endogenous regressor in both third and fifth grades indicates that local language environment is 
strongly related to an individual’s choice of language spoken at home. Results of Breusch-Pagan 
tests provide us with evidence that the errors are heteroskedastic. Based on the F statistics shown 
in the table, we do not find the evidence of weak instruments. The overidentification test statistics 
indicate that our instruments are correlated with neither reading nor math scores for both grades.  
The second-stage results for this internal-plus-external IV estimation are presented in Panel 
A and Panel B of Table 5, Column 2.18 We continue to find a negative effect of a non-English-
language environment at home on reading test scores across both third and fifth grades, but no 
significant effect on math scores in either grades. In the third grade, speaking a language other 
than English at home decreases student reading scores by 0.15 standard deviation, and in the fifth 
grade, this negative effect is about 0.16 standard deviation.  
Overall, both Lewbel IV approach and county IV-plus-Lewbel IV strategy provide us valid 
instruments and allow us to identify a causal effect of language environment at home on child 
cognitive development. The estimates from both models are qualitatively similar to those from an 
OLS model.  
                                                           




5.3 Results on the Growth of Test Scores 
In earlier models, we only focus on the effect of speaking a language other than English at 
home on levels of test scores. This tells us that speaking non-English languages at home decreases 
reading test scores, but provides no information about whether the negative effect increases or 
decreases over time (or whether it leads to a larger or smaller test score gap over time). In addition 
to the effect on levels of test scores, we are also interested in knowing whether a non-English-
language environment at home has any effect on the growth of test scores. If the longer time a 
child is exposed to a bilingual environment, the larger this detrimental effect is, we expect to see 
a negative association between growth of test scores and speaking non-English languages at home. 
However, if the negative effect decreases when a child is more fluent in both languages, we would 
see a positive effect on growth of test scores.  
To test which argument is supported by our data, we estimate the effects of languages 
spoken at home on: (1) the first difference in test scores between the third and fifth grades, and (2) 
the growth rate of test scores from the third to fifth grade. Columns 4-8 of Table 4 report diagnostic 
test statistics on instruments for each model. The results illustrate that our instruments are valid.  
Panel C and Panel D in Table 5 present IV estimation results. Both Lewbel IV results and county 
IV-plus-Lewbel IV results fail to provide any evidence that language environment at home 
influences growth of test scores. Therefore, the negative effect on reading scores in the fifth grade 
appears to be a result of the gap in the third grade. In other words, although language environment 
at home has a long-lasting effect on reading scores in early childhood, the effect does not increase 
(or the cumulative effect does not grow) over time.  
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Our result suggests that language skills might not be the main mechanism through which 
language environment at home affects test scores. If English skill is the main mechanism, with an 
improvement in English among language minority students from the third to fifth grade, we would 
expect a decrease in the test score gap, or a positive effect on growth of test scores.  
 
5.4 Specification Checks 
We conduct several specification checks to examine the robustness of our results. By 
merging our county-level instrument collected by the ACS with ECLS-K data, we lose children 
living in small counties (pop<250,000). Therefore, our county IV-plus-Lewbel IV model is not 
estimated on a full sample. In order to check whether excluding those children would affect our 
results, we use the state-level percentage of the population speaking a language other than English 
at home augmented with Lewbel internal IVs to estimate all the models again. The results on levels 
of test scores and growth of scores are presented in the first column of Table 6.19 As shown, 
speaking a language other than English at home has a significant negative effect on reading scores 
in both third and fifth grades. The magnitude of the negative effect is similar to that found in county 
IV-plus-Lewbel IV estimation. For math scores, the effect is still insignificant in both grades. We 
consistently find no significant effect on growth of test scores. We further restrict the sample by 
including only observations in large counties (pop>250,000) and estimate OLS models, Lewbel 
IV models, and state IV-plus-Lewbel IV models again. We report results for state IV-plus-Lewbel 
IV estimation in Column 2 of Table 6. For both levels of scores and growth of scores, results are 
                                                           
19 In the first-stage estimation, state-level language environment is also strongly associated with an individual’s use 
of language at home. Results on the first-stage estimation and diagnostic tests are not reported here, but are available 
upon request.  
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largely unchanged. The OLS results and Lewbel IV results are also similarly to the results using a 
full sample. 
Next, we exclude students who were not born in the U.S. (about 300 observations in the 
full sample) to see whether our results are affected. Compared with U.S. born children, those who 
came to U.S. at an early age are more likely to experience a culture shock and face obstacles in 
adjusting to a new environment, especially those from non-English speaking countries. Therefore, 
we want to see whether our results are sensitive to this group of people. Column 3 of Table 6 
reports the county IV-plus-Lewbel IV results using a sample of the U.S. born children. As shown, 
the results are not sensitive to whether or not we include non-U.S. born children. 
Overall, we find a robust, consistent negative effect of speaking non-English languages at 
home on reading scores, but such a detrimental effect does not exist for math scores. 
 
6. Subsample Analysis and Results 
6.1 Spanish versus Other Languages 
Since Hispanics are the largest racial/ethnic minority in the U.S. (accounted for 47 percent 
of the foreign-born population and 14.5 percent of total population), Spanish is the most commonly 
spoken language other than English in the U.S. According to the American Community Survey in 
2013, among people who use a language other than English at home, more than 60 percent speak 
Spanish. We are interested to know the effect of a non-English-language language environment at 
home for this particular group not only because a majority of immigrant children speak Spanish, 
but also because the effect may differ between children speaking Spanish and children speaking 
other foreign languages. Children speaking Spanish at home are more likely to be placed in a 
bilingual education program in schools than children speaking other languages (Zehler et al. 2003, 
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Aimee Chin 2015). By far the most common form of bilingual education is Spanish-English. 
Spanish-speaking limited English proficient students are the most numerous, and they are less 
geographically dispersed than other immigrants. These factors could make a non-English language 
environment at home play a different role for Spanish-speaking children and other foreign-
language-speaking children.  
We first restrict the sample to children whose primary language spoken at home is either 
Spanish or English so as to explore the effect of speaking Spanish at home on test scores. Columns 
1 and 2 of Table 7 report the results of Lewbel estimation and county IV-plus-Lewbel IV 
estimation.20 We find that speaking Spanish rather than English at home significantly reduces 
reading scores while it has no effect on math scores in both third and fifth grades. This is consistent 
with the full sample analysis.  
Next, we estimate the effect of a non-English language at home on test scores for children 
who speak non-Spanish at home. We drop children whose primary language at home is Spanish 
from the sample and re-estimate all models again. The results are presented in Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 7. Similar to the results we find in full sample analysis, speaking a language other than 
English at home decreases reading scores, but has no significant effect on math scores. The results 
shown in the first four columns of Table 7 indicate that the effect of speaking a language other 
than English at home on test score differs little by the type of foreign language spoken at home.21  
 
6.2 Boys versus Girls 
                                                           
20 Appendix Table (4) reports the first-stage IV estimation results and diagnostic test statistics on the validity of 
instruments. 
21 Spanish is the only language that we have enough observations to separate it from other non-English languages. 
The sample size for other foreign language users are very small, and we are not able to test the effect by each non-
English language.   
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To test whether the effect of language environment at home on child test scores differs by 
gender, we stratify the sample by gender. Results are presented in Columns 5-8 of Table 7.22 In 
both samples of boys and girls, our results show that speaking a language other than English at 
home has a negative effect on reading scores in the third and fifth grades. For math scores in boys, 
we find that the negative association between a non-English-language home environment and test 
scores in the third grade turns into a positive association in the fifth grade, although neither 
estimate is statistically significant. For math scores in girls, we find that the effect of a non-English-
language environment at home on test scores is negative in both grades. As shown in Column 7, 
speaking a language other than English at home decreases math scores by 0.15 standard deviation 
in the third grade, and 0.14 standard deviation in the fifth grade. Overall, the negative effect of a 
non-English-language environment at home on reading test scores differs little by gender, but its 
effect on math scores does vary between girls and boys. It seems that boys’ math scores are not 
affected by the language used at home, while girls’ math scores are negatively affected by a non-




In this paper, we examine the effect of speaking a language other than English at home on 
students’ academic achievement during early childhood. By controlling for a rich set of child, 
family and school characteristics, our OLS results indicate that the use of a non-English language 
at home is negatively associated with reading test scores in the third grade and this negative 
                                                           




association persists to the fifth grade. However, there is no significant effect on math scores. These 
results remain qualitatively unchanged even after we correct for the potential endogeneity. Both 
our Lewbel IV results and external-plus-internal IV results indicate that speaking a language other 
than English at home decreases reading scores, and the magnitude ranges from 0.14 to 0.17 
standard deviation. The external IV we used is county-level rates of speaking a language other 
than English at home. Further, we do not find any evidence that the use of a language other than 
English at home affects the growth rate of test scores. This indicates that the negative effect on 
reading test scores appears to be a result of the initial gap in the third grade, which is constant over 
time. All the results are robust to a similar set of instruments measured at the state-level. 
By stratifying the sample into several subgroups, we find that the pattern in the effects of 
language environment remains unchanged whether the foreign language is Spanish or not. We also 
find that the effect differs by gender. The language environment appears to have a negative effect 
on both reading and math scores among girls, while it only has a negative effect on reading scores 
for boys. Overall, our results provide the evidence that early language environment has an 
important effect on the cognitive development of 3rd graders, and this effect persists through their 
childhood.  
In sum, these results seem more line with the direct effect of bilingualism on academic 
performance suggested by the subtractive view in the psychology literature. The negative effect 
on reading scores in the third and fifth grades is also consistent with lack of language proficiency 
for English learners. However, since we do not find any significant effect on growth of test scores, 
the language-skill mechanism seems not to be the main mechanism unless there is no improvement 
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on English for language minority students from the third to fifth grade.23 The fact that all of 
students in our sample have passed the English screening test before Grade 3 provides another 
argument that English skill is not the main mechanism.  
Closing the achievement gap between children of immigrants and their native peers has 
been a long-standing goal for educators. Up to date, most policy makers and researchers have been 
focusing on evaluating the effectiveness of various education programs in schools, while relatively 
less attention has been put on family environment. Our study provides evidence that the language 
environment at home has a significant effect on academic achievement during early childhood and 
suggests for potential policy interventions.  
The issue of how to help language minority students is also at the center stage of education 
policy debates. In earlier years between 1970 and 1990, both federal and some individual states 
had laws mandating bilingual education programs in certain schools to address the educational 
needs of limited English proficiency students. However, since the late 1990s, there has been a shift 
away from using bilingual education toward using English-only programs to help these students. 
In the last 15 years, two thirds states have eliminated bilingual education programs in public 
schools. Our results contribute to this debate by providing some indirect evidence that learning 
and speaking two or more languages has a negative effect on academic performance at early 
childhood, and support for using English-only programs to help language minority students.  
                                                           
23 This could be true if language minority students are more concentrated in certain schools, and mainly talk and play 
with students speaking the same foreign language. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (Test Scores) 
 
Variables Language Environment at Home Difference 
 English Non-English  
  (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) 
    
Panel A: Grade 3 Test Scores   
Reading 0.05 -0.39 0.44*** 
 (0.99) (0.97)  
Mathematics 0.03 -0.26 0.29*** 
 (1.00) (0.98)  
Science 0.07 -0.54 0.61*** 
 (0.99) (0.91)  
N 9371 1150  
    
Panel B: Grade 5 Test Scores   
Reading 0.06 -0.39 0.45*** 
 (0.99) (1.01)  
Mathematics 0.03 -0.19 0.22*** 
 (0.99) (1.04)  
Science 0.07 -0.45 0.52*** 
 (0.98) (1.04)  
N  7671 1086  
        
Note: 1. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All test scores are standardized to a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one.  





Table 2. Summary Statistics (Control Variables) 
 
    Language Environment at Home   
Variables Control Set English Non-English Difference 
  (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) 
Grade 3 Sample 
Race/Ethnicity     
White A 0.71 0.07 0.64*** 
  (0.46) (0.25)  
Black A 0.12 0.01 0.11*** 
  (0.32) (0.09)  
Hispanic A 0.10 0.62 -0.52*** 
  (0.29) (0.49)  
Asian A 0.03 0.27 -0.25*** 
  (0.16) (0.44)  
Other A 0.06 0.03 0.02*** 
  (0.23) (0.18)  
Male A 0.50 0.52 -0.02 
  (0.50) (0.50)  
Age (in months)     
less than 105 months A 0.07 0.10 -0.04*** 
  (0.25) (0.31)  
105-107  months A 0.20 0.22 -0.01 
  (0.40) (0.41)  
108-110  months A 0.23 0.22 0.01 
  (0.42) (0.41)  
111-113  months A 0.23 0.27 -0.04*** 
  (0.42) (0.44)  
114-116  months A 0.18 0.15 0.01*** 
  (0.39) (0.36)  
117 or more  months A 0.09 0.04 0.05*** 
  (0.28) (0.20)  
Birth Weight (1 b) A 6.99 6.86 0.13*** 
  (1.32) (1.27)  
     
Father's Education     
Less than High School B 0.05 0.29 -0.24*** 
  (0.23) (0.45)  
High School B 0.21 0.2 0.01 
  (0.41) (0.40)  
Some College B 0.24 0.17 0.07*** 
  (0.43) (0.37)  
Bachelor and Above B 0.31 0.21 0.10*** 
  (0.46) (0.41)  
Education Missing B 0.19 0.13 0.05*** 
  (0.39) (0.34)  
Mother's Education     
Less than High School B 0.06 0.33 -0.27*** 
  (0.23) (0.47)  
High School B 0.24 0.23 0.01 





Cont. Table 2. Summary Statistics (Control Variables) 
 
   Language Environment at Home  
Variables Set English Non-English Difference 
  (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) 
Grade 3 Sample 
Mother's Education     
Some College B 0.38 0.23 0.14*** 
  (0.49) (0.42)  
Bachelor and Above B 0.32 0.2 0.12*** 
  (0.47) (0.40)  
Log Family Income (in 1998) B 10.63 9.97 0.66*** 
  (1.50) (1.94)  
Numbers of Books at Home B 137.34 61.66 75.68*** 
  (189.35) (102.96)  
Own a computer at Home B 0.85 0.67 0.18*** 
  (0.36) (0.47)  
Number of Siblings B 1.52 1.87 -0.35*** 
  (1.06) (1.34)  
Single Parents B 0.19 0.13 0.06*** 
  (0.39) (0.34)  
     
Public School C 0.78 0.91 -0.13*** 
  (0.42) (0.29)  
Transfer Student  C 0.16 0.19 -0.03*** 
  (0.37) (0.39)  
School Region     
Northeast C 0.20 0.17 0.03*** 
  (0.40) (0.38)  
Midwest C 0.29 0.13 0.16*** 
  (0.45) (0.33)  
South C 0.32 0.24 0.09*** 
  (0.47) (0.43)  
West C 0.19 0.46 -0.28*** 
  (0.39) (0.50)  
School Urbanicity     
Central City C 0.34 0.58 -0.24*** 
  (0.47) (0.49)  
Urban and Large Town C 0.40 0.35 0.06*** 
  (0.49) (0.48)  
Small Town and Rural C 0.25 0.07 0.18*** 
  (0.44) (0.26)  
     
Born in the U.S. D 0.99 0.89 0.01*** 
  (0.10) (0.31)  
Came to the U.S.  D 0.00 0.06 0.05*** 
After Age 3  (0.05) (0.23)  
N  9599 1213  
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Control set A includes all variables listed in set A. Control set B 
includes variables in control set A and variables listed in set B. Control Set C includes variables in control set B 
and variables listed in set C. Control set D includes variables in control set C and variables listed in set D. 




Table 3. OLS Results: the Effect of Speaking 
A Language Other Than English at Home on Test Scores 
 
  OLS Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Panel A: Grade 3 Test Scores    
     
Reading Tests -0.342*** -0.080** -0.081** -0.081** 
 (0.070) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) 
     
Math Tests -0.218** 0.005 -0.013 -0.016 
 (0.075) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
     
N 10521 10521 10521 10521 
     
Panel B: Grade 5 Test Scores    
     
Reading Tests -0.358*** -0.108** -0.114*** -0.124*** 
 (0.074) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036) 
     
Math Tests -0.164** 0.049 0.027 0.019 
 (0.066) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
     
N 8757 8757 8757 8757 
     
     
Control Sets A B C D  
 
Note: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
2. Control set A includes children's characteristics: race/ethnicity, gender, age (in months), birth weight; 
control set B includes the variables in control set A and household characteristics: father's education, mother's 
education, log family income in the kindergarten year, number of books at home, ownership of a computer, 
number of siblings, marital status; control set C includes the variables in control set B and school 
characteristics: attending public school, indicator of a transfer student, school region, and school urbanicity; 
control set D includes the variables in control set C and born in the U.S. and entered into the U.S. after age 
3. 







Table 4. Diagnostic Tests for Instruments in IV Estimation 
(Dependent Variable: Speaking a Language Other Than English at Home) 
   Lewbel IV  Lewbel IV County IV County IV  Lewbel IV  Lewbel IV County IV County IV 
   +Lewbel IV + Lewbel IV   +Lewbel IV + Lewbel IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Estimation on Level of Test Scores Estimation on Growth of Test Scores 
 Grade 3  Grade 5 Grade 3  Grade 5 First Difference Growth  First Difference Growth  
Coefficients on External Instruments     Rate  Rate 
% Population Speaking    0.116*** 0.132***   0.114*** 0.114*** 
 Non-English at Home    (0.027) (0.031)   (0.027) (0.027) 
         
Heteroskedasticity Test         
Breusch-Pagan Test Stat. 9528.316 6925.157 3298.517 2250.292 6546.391 6546.391 2148.215 2148.215 
Breusch-Pagan p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
Weak Instruments Tests        
F Stat. on Instruments 613.444 595.876 596.817 416.336 1674.034 1674.034 495.897 495.897 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 1154.114 717.962 468.546 333.854 1537.129 1537.129 413.696 413.696 
      
Overidentification Test  (Outcome: Reading  Scores)      
Hansen J Statistic 14.301 16.487 9.341 15.069 4.622 3.350 7.652 5.631 
Hansen Test p Value 0.112 0.157 0.674 0.238 0.706 0.851 0.239 0.352 
Overidentification Test  (Outcome: Math  Scores)       
Hansen J Statistic 16.921 10.460 11.177 9.454 3.666 3.519 7.865 6.784 
Hansen Test p Value 0.257 0.315 0.514 0.664 0.817 0.833 0.312 0.432 
         
N 10521 8757 5525 4625 7822 7822 4082 4082 
Adj. R-Squared 0.852 0.844 0.703 0.67 0.846 0.846 0.787 0.787 
Note: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
2. All models include variables in control set D.  For its definitions, refer to Table (2) notes for details. 
3. Breusch-Pagan test is performed to examine the existence of the heteroskedasticity of the residuals in the first-stage. As shown in this table, we reject the null of 
no heteroscedasticity for all variables together at p ≤ 0.0001 level. 
4. Joint F test on excluded instruments is conducted and test statistic is reported. We are able to reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments when F statistic is 
greater than 10 (for details, see Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
5. Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for weak identification is reported (for test details, see Stock and Yogo, 2005). According to Stock-Yogo critical values, for 
all estimations, we have rejected the null hypothesis that instruments are weakly associated with the potential endogenous variable “speaking non-English languages 
at home” at p ≤ 0.001 level. 
6 Hansen overidentification test statistic and p-values are reported. For p ≥ 0.1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with test 
scores. 
Source: Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K). 
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Table 5. IV Results: the Effect of Speaking a Language Other Than 
English at Home on the Level of Test Scores and Growth of Test Scores 
 
  Lewbel IV County IV + Lewbel IV 
  (1) (2) 
Panel A: Grade 3 Test Scores  
Reading Tests -0.140*** -0.149*** 
 (0.030) (0.035) 
   
Math Tests -0.078 -0.097 
 (0.057) (0.059) 
N 10521 5525 
   
Panel B: Grade 5 Test Scores  
Reading Tests -0.174*** -0.159*** 
 (0.039) (0.048) 
   
Math Tests -0.053 -0.054 
 (0.037) (0.043) 
N 8757 4625 
   
   
Panel C: Difference of Test Scores Between Grade 5 and Grade 3 
Reading  0.004 -0.082 
 (0.811) (0.632) 
   
Math 0.812 0.741 
 (0.659) (0.586) 
N 7822 4082 
   
Panel D: Growth Rate of Test Scores from Grade 3 to Grade 5 
Reading  0.007 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
   
Math 0.012 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
N 7822 4082 
   
Control Set  D D 
Note: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors in Column 2 are 
clustered at county level. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
2. For definitions of control set D, please refer to Table (3) for details. 
3. The dependent variable in Panel C is the difference of test scores between the third 
grade and the fifth grade. The dependent variable in Panel D is the growth rate of test 
scores from the third grade to the fifth grade. 




Table 6. Results for Specification Checks 
 
   State IV  State IV  County IV  
 + Lewbel IV + Lewbel IV + Lewbel IV 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Specification Use State IV Restrict to Large Counties Exclude Non-U.S. Born 
Panel A: Grade 3 Test Scores   
Reading Tests -0.133*** -0.153*** -0.159*** 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.058) 
    
Math Tests -0.071 -0.098 -0.104 
 (0.047) (0.064) (0.059) 
N 10521 5525 5388 
    
Panel B: Grade 5 Test Scores   
Reading Tests -0.185*** -0.167*** -0.186*** 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.062) 
    
Math Tests -0.047 -0.056 -0.056 
 (0.038) (0.044) (0.045) 
N 8757 4625 4489 
    
    
Panel C: Difference of Test Scores Between Grade 5 and Grade 3 
Reading Tests 0.002 -0.049 -0.272 
 (0.644) (0.634) (1.028) 
    
Math Tests 0.843 0.656 0.657 
 (0.528) (0.592) (0.797) 
N 7822 4082 3875 
    
Panel D: Growth Rate of Test Scores from Grade 3 to Grade 5 
Reading Tests 0.007 0.007 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) 
    
Math Tests 0.012 0.013 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
N 7822 4082 3975 
    
Control Set D D D 
Note: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors in Column 2 are clustered at county level. 
***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
2. For definitions of control set D, please refer to Table (3) for details. 
3. The dependent variable in Panel C is the difference of test scores between the third grade and the fifth grade. The 
dependent variable in Panel D is the growth rate of test scores from the third grade to the fifth grade. 






Table 7. Effects of Speaking Non-English Languages at Home on Test Scores: Subgroup Analysis 
 
  Lewbel IV County IV Lewbel IV County IV Lewbel IV County IV Lewbel IV County IV 
  + Lewbel IV  + Lewbel IV  + Lewbel IV  + Lewbel IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
 Spanish or English Non-Spanish Boys Girls 
Panel A: Grade 3 Test Scores       
         
Reading  -0.139 -0.143*** -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.150*** -0.161*** -0.139*** -0.147*** 
 (0.046) (0.031) (0.047) (0.045) (0.057) (0.059) (0.057) (0.065) 
         
Math -0.047 -0.053 -0.033 -0.018 -0.048 -0.064 -0.113*** -0.121*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.068) (0.061) (0.075) (0.059) (0.054) 
         
N 10152 5249 10114 5229 5335 2788 5186 2737 
         
Panel B: Grade 5 Test Scores       
         
Reading  -0.187 -0.118*** -0.153*** -0.110* -0.196 -0.164** -0.201*** -0.148*** 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.052) (0.061) (0.063) (0.068) (0.061) (0.064) 
         
Math -0.039 0.009 -0.013 0.012 0.023 0.052 -0.153*** -0.138*** 
 (0.051) (0.041) (0.055) (0.078) (0.066) (0.074) (0.066) (0.055) 
         
N 8411 4360 8368 4318 4393 2289 4364 2336 
         
Control Sets D  D  D D  D  D  D D  
Note: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors in Column 2 are clustered at county level. ***, **, and * indicate the 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
2. For definitions of control set D, please refer to Table (3) for details. 





Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics (Control Variables) 
 
    Language Environment at Home   
Variables Set English Non-English Difference 
  (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) 
Grade 5 Sample 
Race/Ethnicity     
White A 0.71 0.07 0.64*** 
  (0.45) (0.25)  
Black A 0.11 0.01 0.1*** 
  (0.31) (0.11)  
Hispanic A 0.10 0.62 -0.52*** 
  (0.30) (0.49)  
Asian A 0.03 0.27 -0.24*** 
  (0.16) (0.44)  
Other A 0.06 0.03 0.02*** 
  (0.23) (0.18)  
Male A 0.50 0.49 0.01 
  (0.50) (0.50)  
Age (in months)     
148-162 months A 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
  (0.10) (0.12)  
163-168  months A 0.29 0.33 -0.04*** 
  (0.45) (0.47)  
169-174  months A 0.46 0.48 -0.03 
  (0.50) (0.50)  
175-180  months A 0.23 0.16 0.06*** 
  (0.42) (0.37)  
181-203  months A 0.02 0.01 0.01*** 
  (0.14) (0.09)  
Birth Weight A 7.00 6.86 0.15*** 
  (1.33) (1.29)  
     
Father's Education     
Less than High School B 0.05 0.27 -0.22*** 
  (0.22) (0.44)  
High School B 0.21 0.21 0.00 
  (0.41) (0.41)  
Some College B 0.24 0.17 0.07*** 
  (0.43) (0.37)  
Bachelor and Above B 0.31 0.21 0.10*** 
  (0.46) (0.41)  
Education Missing B 0.20 0.15 0.05*** 
  (0.40) (0.35)  
Mother's Education     
Less than High School B 0.05 0.29 -0.24*** 
  (0.22) (0.45)  
High School B 0.24 0.25 0.00 
  (0.43) (0.43)  
Some College B 0.38 0.24 0.14*** 
  (0.49) (0.43)  
Bachelor and Above B 0.33 0.22 0.11*** 
  (0.47) (0.41)  
Log Family Income  B 10.64 10.03 0.61*** 
(in 1998)  (1.52) (1.73)  
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  Language Environment at Home  
Variables Set English Non-English Difference 
  (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) 
 Grade 5 Sample  
     
Numbers of Books at Home B 120.75 56.11 64.65*** 
  (183.18) (88.82)  
Own a computer at Home B 0.89 0.77 0.13*** 
  (0.31) (0.42)  
Number of Siblings B 1.51 1.91 -0.4*** 
  (1.07) (1.35)  
Single Parents B 0.20 0.15 0.05*** 
  (0.40) (0.35)  
     
Public School C 0.78 0.91 -0.13*** 
  (0.41) (0.29)  
Transfer Student C 0.18 0.20 -0.02*** 
  (0.38) (0.40)  
Region     
Northeast C 0.20 0.16 0.04*** 
  (0.40) (0.37)  
Midwest C 0.29 0.15 0.15*** 
  (0.46) (0.35)  
South C 0.32 0.24 0.08*** 
  (0.47) (0.42)  
West C 0.18 0.46 -0.27*** 
  (0.39) (0.50)  
Urbanicity     
Central City C 0.33 0.58 -0.25*** 
  (0.47) (0.49)  
Urban and Large Town C 0.40 0.34 0.06*** 
  (0.49) (0.47)  
Small Town and Rural C 0.27 0.08 0.19*** 
  (0.44) (0.27)  
     
Born in the U.S. D 0.99 0.88 0.11*** 
  (0.10) (0.32)  
Came to the U.S. D 0.00 0.06 -0.05*** 
After Age 3  (0.06) (0.23)  
     
N  7936 1157  
     
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Control set A includes all variables listed in set 
A. Control set B includes variables in control set A and variables listed in set B. Control Set C includes 
variables in control set B and variables listed in set C. Control set D includes variables in control set C 
and variables listed in set D. 




Appendix Table 2. Full First-Stage Results of Lewbel IV Estimation 
 
   Lewbel IV    Lewbel IV 
Variables  (1)   (2) 
    
 Grade 3  Grade 5 
    
White -0.017*** White -0.011* 
 (0.005)  (0.006) 
Black 0.376*** Black 0.396*** 
 (0.005)  (0.006) 
Hispanic 0.505*** Hispanic 0.514*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
Asian 0.047*** Asian 0.047*** 
 (0.004)  (0.006) 
Other 0.001 Other -0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
Age  Age  
105-107 months -0.019*** 163-168 months -0.014 
 (0.006)  (0.017) 
108-110 months -0.016** 169-174 months -0.013 
 (0.006)  (0.017) 
111-113 months -0.014 175-180 months -0.015 
 -0.016  (0.017) 
114-116 months -0.021 181-203 months -0.021 
 -0.016  (0.020) 
117 or more months -0.021   
 (0.107)   
Birth Weight 0.003*** Birth Weight 0.004*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Dad's Education Dad's Education  
High School -0.059*** High School -0.065*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007) 
Some College -0.061*** Some College -0.071*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007) 
Bachelor and Above -0.055*** Bachelor and Above -0.065*** 
 (0.007)  (0.008) 
Education Missing -0.059*** Education Missing -0.069*** 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
Mom's Education Mom's Education 
High School -0.075*** High School -0.085*** 
 (0.007)  (0.008) 
Some College -0.071*** Some College -0.080*** 
 (0.007)  (0.008) 
Bachelor and Above -0.065*** Bachelor and Above -0.073*** 
 (0.008)  (0.009) 
Ln(Family Income) in 1998 -0.003*** Ln(Family Income) in 1998 -0.003** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Number of Books -0.000 Number of Books -0.000** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Own a Computer -0.011*** Own a Computer -0.006 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Number of Siblings 0.005*** Number of Siblings 0.009*** 
 (0.001)  (0.002) 
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   Lewbel IV    Lewbel IV 
Variables  (1)   (2) 
    
 Grade 3  Grade 5 
    
Public School 0.001 Public School 0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Transfer Student 0.002 Transfer Student 0.006 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Midwest -0.005 Midwest -0.005 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
South -0.013*** South -0.016*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
West 0.001 West 0.000 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Urban and Large Town -0.013*** Urban and Large Town -0.016*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Small Town and Rural -0.022*** Small Town and Rural -0.028*** 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Born in the U.S. -0.210*** Born in the U.S. -0.213*** 
 (0.028)  (0.027) 
Entered in the U.S.  0.144*** Entered in the U.S.  0.150*** 
After Age 3 (0.036) After Age 3 (0.037) 
IV1(Hispanic) 1.182*** IV1(Hispanic) 1.178*** 
 (0.025)  (0.028) 
IV2(Asian) 1.175*** IV2(Asian) 1.173*** 
 (0.024)  (0.028) 
IV3(Other) 1.117*** IV3(Other) 1.085*** 
 (0.057)  (0.070) 
IV4(ln Income) -0.014* IV4(ln Income) -0.016** 
 (0.007)  (0.008) 
IV5(Midwest) -0.139   
 (0.086)   
IV6(South) -0.162*** IV5(South) -0.163** 
 (0.063)  (0.068) 
IV7(West) -0.040   
 (0.052)   
IV8(Small Town) -0.300*** IV6(Small Town) -0.346*** 
 (0.076)  (0.080) 
IV9(Entered in the U.S.  0.315*** IV7(Entered in the U.S.  0.418*** 
After Age 3) (0.087) After Age 3) (0.110) 
  IV8(Own a Computer) -0.041 
   (0.021) 
Constant 0.392***  0.403*** 
 (0.034)  (0.038) 
    
N 8757  8757 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors in Column 2 are clustered at county 
level. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Each instrument is constructed using [?8 − /(?8)] ∗ =8. 
Source: Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K). 
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Appendix Table 3. Full First-Stage Results of County IV+ Lewbel IV Estimation 
 
  County IV   County IV 
 +Lewbel IV  + Lewbel IV 
  (1)   (2) 
 Grade 3  Grade 5 
    
White -0.022* White -0.022 
 (0.012)  (0.016) 
Black 0.354*** Black 0.374*** 
 (0.016)  (0.018) 
Hispanic 0.522*** Hispanic 0.517*** 
 (0.016)  (0.016) 
Asian 0.025 Asian 0.035* 
 (0.017)  (0.019) 
Other 0.004 Other 0.005 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Age  Age  
105-107 months -0.009 105-107 months -0.008 
 (0.008)  (0.022) 
108-110 months -0.008 108-110 months -0.000 
 (0.008)  (0.021) 
111-113 months -0.005 111-113 months -0.004 
 (0.008)  (0.022) 
114-116 months -0.012 114-116 months -0.033 
 (0.008)  (0.028) 
117 or more months -0.014 117 or more months  
 (0.013)   
Birth Weight 0.003** Birth Weight 0.004** 
 (0.001)  (0.002) 
Dad's Education  Dad's Education 
High School -0.110*** High School -0.119*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013) 
Some College -0.109*** Some College -0.130*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012) 
Bachelor and Above -0.097*** Bachelor and Above -0.117*** 
 (0.015)  (0.015) 
Education Missing -0.118*** Education Missing -0.138*** 
 (0.014)  (0.013) 
Mom's Education  Mom's Education 
High School -0.122*** High School -0.146*** 
 (0.018)  (0.019) 
Some College -0.123*** Some College -0.140*** 
 (0.019)  (0.020) 
Bachelor and Above -0.110*** Bachelor and Above -0.123*** 
 (0.017)  (0.020) 
Ln(Family Income) in 1998 -0.009** Ln(Family Income) in 1998 -0.014*** 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Number of Books -0.000 Number of Books -0.000** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Own a Computer -0.014** Own a Computer 0.011 
 (0.007)  (0.008) 
Number of Siblings 0.005* Number of Siblings 0.008*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
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Cont. Appendix Table 3. Full First-Stage Results of County IV+ Lewbel IV Estimation 
  County IV   County IV 
 +Lewbel IV  + Lewbel IV 
  (1)   (2) 
 Grade 3  Grade 5 
    
Public School 0.001 Public School 0.005 
 (0.009)  (0.011) 
Transfer Student -0.004 Transfer Student 0.017* 
 (0.006)  (0.009) 
Midwest 0.000 Midwest -0.001 
 (0.007)  (0.008) 
South -0.010 South -0.019** 
 (0.007)  (0.009) 
West -0.007 West -0.009 
 (0.006)  (0.009) 
Urban and Large Town -0.004 Urban and Large Town -0.010 
 (0.006)  (0.007) 
Small Town and Rural -0.022** Small Town and Rural -0.016 
 (0.011)  (0.017) 
Born in the U.S. -0.276*** Born in the U.S. -0.256*** 
 (0.030)  (0.021) 
Entered in the U.S. After Age 3 0.035 Entered in the U.S. After Age 3 0.091** 
 (0.047)  (0.037) 
IV1(Hispanic) 1.260*** IV1(Hispanic) 1.293*** 
 (0.076)  (0.072) 
IV2(Asian) 1.214*** IV2(Asian) 1.251*** 
 (0.053)  (0.059) 
IV3(Other) 0.877*** IV3(Other) 0.879*** 
 (0.235)  (0.236) 
IV4(Dad's Education -0.017 IV4(Dad's Education 0.073* 
High School) (0.048) High School) (0.042) 
IV5(Dad's Education 0.118 IV5(Dad's Education 0.136* 
Bachelor and Above) (0.081) Bachelor and Above) (0.068) 
IV6(Ln Income) -0.027* IV6(Ln Income) -0.028* 
 (0.016)  (0.015) 
IV7(Midwest) -0.275   
 (0.230)   
IV8(South) -0.287*   
 (0.148)   
IV9(West) -0.061   
 (0.136)   
IV10(Born in the U.S. ) -0.334*** IV7(Born in the U.S. ) -0.250*** 
 (0.094)  (0.079) 
IV11(Entered in the U.S.  0.062*** IV8(Entered in the U.S.  0.234*** 
After Age 3) (0.112) After Age 3) (0.135) 
IV12(% Population Speaking 0.116*** IV9(% Population Speaking 0.132*** 
Non-English Languages) (0.027) Non-English Languages) (0.031) 
Constant 0.578***  0.623*** 
 (0.068)  (0.072) 
N 4625  4625 
Note: Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors in Column 2 are clustered at 
county level. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Each instrument is constructed using [?8 − /(?8)] ∗ =8 






Appendix Table 4. Diagnostic Tests of Instruments in IV Estimation: Sample of Spanish & Non-Spanish 
  Lewbel IV Lewbel IV County IV County IV Lewbel IV Lewbel IV County IV County IV 
   +Lewbel IV + Lewbel IV   +Lewbel IV + Lewbel IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Speaking Spanish or English Speaking Non-Spanish 
  Grade 3  Grade 5  Grade 3  Grade 5  Grade 3  Grade 5  Grade 3  Grade 5 
Coefficients on External Instruments       
% Population Speaking  0.037*** 0.049***   0.101*** 0.094*** 
 Non-English at Home   (0.013) (0.013)   (0.034) (0.026) 
         
Heteroskedasticity Test        
Breusch-Pagan Test Stat. 13487.531 10149.352 4720.206 3289.734 11951.162 8376.061 4213.043 2871.617 
Breusch-Pagan p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
Weak Instruments Tests       
F Stat. on Instruments 3878.000 3307.041 1385.283 1733.914 2076.770 1515.667 543.254 498.140 
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat. 3578.156 3479.210 1149.052 1846.138 1931.751 1632.951 493.312 486.393 
Overidentification Test  (Outcome: Reading  Scores)     
Hansen J Statistic 4.643 10.435 10.031 12.611 6.186 12.989 4.972 13.890 
Hansen Test p Value 0.703 0.165 0.187 0.131 0.518 0.172 0.663 0.153 
Overidentification Test  (Outcome: Math Scores)     
Hansen J Statistic 10.816 9.913 8.975 13.892 13.663 10.010 5.585 11.289 
Hansen Test p Value 0.147 0.194 0.254 0.125 0.158 0.188 0.589 0.126 
         
Control Set D D D D D D D D 
N 101520 8411 5249 4360 10114 8368 5229 4318 
Adj. R-Squared 0.906 0.909 0.864 0.832 0.807 0.79 0.631 0.611 
Note: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
2. For definitions of control set D, refer to Table (3) for details. 
3. Breusch-Pagan test is performed to examine the existence of the heteroskedasticity of the residuals in the first-stage. As shown in this table, we reject the null of 
no heteroscedasticity for all variables together at p ≤ 0.0001 level. 
4. Joint F test on excluded instruments is conducted and test statistic is reported. We are able to reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments when F statistic is 
greater than 10 (for details, see Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
5. Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for weak identification is reported (for test details, see Stock and Yogo, 2005). According to Stock-Yogo critical values, for 
all estimations, we have rejected the null hypothesis that instruments are weakly associated with the potential endogenous variable “speaking non-English languages 
at home” at p ≤ 0.001 level. 
6 Hansen overidentification test statistic and p-values are reported. For p ≥ 0.1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with test 
scores. 








Appendix Table 5. Diagnostic Tests of Instruments in IV Estimation: Sample of Boys & Girls 
  Lewbel IV Lewbel IV County IV County IV Lewbel IV Lewbel IV County IV County IV 
   +Lewbel IV +Lewbel IV   +Lewbel IV +Lewbel IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Boys Girls 
  Grade 3  Grade 5  Grade 3  Grade 5  Grade 3  Grade 5  Grade 3  Grade 5 
Coefficients on External Instruments      
% Population Speaking 0.116*** 0.138***   0.124*** 0.135*** 
 Non-English at Home  (0.035) (0.039)   (0.034) (0.037) 
       
Heteroskedasticity Test       
Breusch-Pagan Test Stat. 4819.877 3486.085 1665.220 1113.904 4686.516 3369.319 1591.387 1113.175 
Breusch-Pagan p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
Weak Instruments Tests       
F Stat. on Instruments 1070.355 789.143 292.757 213.958 1358.818 997.901 748.351 531.293 
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat. 910.129 964.253 278.093 210.459 1218.963 857.301 484.035 352.154 
Overidentification Test  (Outcome: Reading  Scores)     
Hansen J Statistic 7.199 7.742 8.922 10.849 5.389 13.035 12.159 15.614 
Hansen Test p Value 0.408 0.356 0.710 0.542 0.613 0.071 0.433 0.210 
Overidentification Test  (Outcome: Math Scores)     
Hansen J Statistic 12.583 7.097 7.207 11.998 12.451 10.362 13.141 12.585 
Hansen Test p Value 0.183 0.419 0.844 0.446 0.117 0.169 0.359 0.400 
         
Control Set D D D D D D D D 
N 5335 4393 2788 2289 5186 4364 2737 2336 
Adj. R-Squared 0.841 0.833 0.803 0.789 0.848 0.838 0.714 0.681 
Note: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
2. For definitions of control set D, refer to Table (2) notes for details. 
3. Breusch-Pagan test is performed to examine the existence of the heteroskedasticity of the residuals in the first-stage. As shown in this table, we reject the null of 
no heteroscedasticity for all variables together at p ≤ 0.0001 level. 
4. Joint F test on excluded instruments is conducted and test statistic is reported. We are able to reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments when F statistic is 
greater than 10 (for details, see Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
5. Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for weak identification is reported (for test details, see Stock and Yogo, 2005). According to Stock-Yogo critical values, for 
all estimations, we have rejected the null hypothesis that instruments are weakly associated with the potential endogenous variable “speaking non-English languages 
at home” at p ≤ 0.001 level. 
6 Hansen overidentification test statistic and p-values are reported. For p ≥ 0.1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with test 
scores. 
Source: Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K) 
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